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DISSENT INTO CONFUSION: THE SUPREME COURT, DENIALISM,
AND THE FALSE "SCIENTIFIC" CONTROVERSY OVER SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME
Joelle Anne Moreno* & Brian Holmgren**
I. INTRODUCTION
Some scientific controversies are real; some are false. Challenges to the
existence of global warming, and arguments about childhood vaccines causing
autism or intelligent design versus evolution are false controversies because there
is near consensus in the global scientific community on these questions.' Near
consensus in science means that, as with all legitimate scientific research, there are
unsettled questions that merit future investigation and reasonable experts may
differ over select issues, but these unresolved matters do not threaten core
scientific foundations. In contrast, false scientific controversies have been
fabricated and are a form of denialism 2 -the rejection of scientifically sound
* 0 2013 Joalle Anne Moreno. Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty
Research & Development, Florida International University College of Law.
** C 2013 Brian Holmgren. Assistant District Attorney General and Child Abuse
Team Leader, Davidson County District Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN.
1 See generally Leah Ceccarelli, Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science,
Rhetoric, and Public Debate, 14 RHETORIC & PUB. AFFAIRS 195 (2011) (discussing the
false "manufactured" controversies of global warming skepticism, dissent over AIDS being
caused by HIV, and intelligent design); see also Understanding Evolution, UNIV. CAL.
MUSEUM PALEONTOLOGY, http://evolution.berkeley.edu (last visited Mar. 10, 2013)
(discussing the false "scientific controversy" of intelligent design versus evolution);
Vaccine Safety, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccinesafety (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (discussing the false "scientific controversy"
regarding whether childhood vaccines can cause autism). As Professor Susan Haack has
observed:
At any time there is a whole continuum of scientific ideas, claims, and
theories: some so well-warranted by such strong evidence that it is most unlikely
they will have to be revised; some not quite so well-warranted but still pretty
solidly established; some promising but as yet far from certain; some new and
exciting but highly speculative and as yet untested; and some so wild that few
mainstream scientists are willing even to listen to them. (The proportion of the
well-warranted to the highly-speculative varies, obviously, across fields and
sub-fields.) A few of the exciting but as yet untested ideas, and a very, very few
of the wildest ideas, will eventually turn out to be warrantable; but most will not.
Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 996-97 (2008).
2 See generally MICHAEL SPECTER, DENIALISM: How IRRATIONAL THINKING
HINDERS SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, HARMS THE PLANET, AND THREATENS OUR LIVES (2009)
(describing the phenomenon of denialism and discussing its dangers); Martin McKee &
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information in favor of purported "truth" claims that cannot be empirically
supported.3 In her excellent work on manufactured controversies, Professor Leah
Ceccarelli explains that a false scientific controversy is typically marked by an
announcement that "there is an ongoing scientific debate in the technical sphere
about a matter for which there is actually overwhelming scientific consensus.",
Professor Ceccarelli also identifies several common strategies used to manufacture
false controversies, including (1) the use of mercenary scientists, (2) the use of
cherry-picked data and manipulation of statistical methods, (3) the manufacture
and promotion of doubt and uncertainty, and (4) the use of rhetoric to manufacture
controversy in addition to uncertainty.5
In the United States Supreme Court's first opinion on the merits from its
2011-2012 term, three members of the Court contributed their authoritative voices
to one of the most recent-and one of the most deadly-false scientific
controversies, the purported scientific debate over the medical diagnosis of shaken
baby syndrome (SBS), a prevalent form of abusive head trauma (AHT).
On October 31, 2011, in Cavazos v. Smith,6 the Supreme Court upheld Shirley
Ree Smith's conviction for causing the death of her seven-week-old grandson,
Etzel.' This conviction was based on the jury finding that Etzel died from SBS, a
diagnosis that has been recognized as clinically valid and evidence-based by an
overwhelming majority of pediatric medical specialists for almost half a century,8
Pascal Diethelm, How the Growth of Denialism Undermines Public Health, 341 BMJ
1309, 1310 (2010) (noting that "denialism" in the medical arena is characterized by several
features, including (a) "[i]dentification of conspiracies," (b) "use of fake experts," (c)
"selectivity of citation," (d) "[c]reation of impossible expectations of research," (e)
"[m]isrepresentation and logical fallacies," and (f) "[m]anufacture of doubt"). Denialism
and, more specifically, explorations of manufactured "scientific controversies" such as
Professor Ceceralli's work, supra note 1, at 195, provide generally useful tools for
understanding much of the specific scientific, pseudoscientific, and legal academic
information discussed below.
3 See McKee & Diethelm, supra note 2, at 1309.
4 Ceccarelli, supra note 1, at 196 (emphasis added).
sId. at 197.
6 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (per curiam).
7 Id. at 8. The relevant statute provides, "Any person who, having the care or custody
of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that to a
reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child's
death, shall be punished by imprisonment . .. ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West 2008).
8 The original articles commenting on SBS were published in the early 1970s. See
John Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants: Its Potential Residual Effects
of Permanent Brain Damage and Mental Retardation, 124 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 161
(1972); John Caffey, The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the
Extremities with Whiplash-Induced Intracranial and Intraocular Bleedings, Linked with
Residual Permanent Brain Damage and Mental Retardation, 54 PEDIATRICS 396 (1974);
A.N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and Its Relationship to Whiplash Injuries,
759 BMJ 430 (1971). Over the past four decades, AHT/SBS has been well documented in
the peer-reviewed medical literature. The research supporting this diagnosis includes (1)
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substantiated by the bulk of the medical research in a range of scientific
disciplines, 9 recognized and defined by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention,' 0 and widely accepted by courts in the United States" and numerous
foreign countries. Following a brief review of the evidence presented at trial, the
Supreme Court issued a scientifically accurate per curiam decision. The Court held
that the Ninth Circuit had improperly "substituted its judgment for that of a
California jury on the question of whether the prosecution's or defense's expert
witnesses more persuasively explained the cause of a death." 2
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, seized this
opportunity to issue an unusual and scientifically inaccurate dissenting opinion.
Based on their review of the medical and nonmedical evidence presented in this
case, the dissenters opined that "[flew of the signs of SBS were present." 3 More
generally, the Court's summary adjudication of the Smith case was "untoward"
because the dissenters believed that "[d]oubt has increased in the medical
two medical treatises, (2) at least fourteen chapters in other medical treatises, (3) over
seven hundred peer-reviewed clinical medical articles published by over one thousand
medical authors from at least twenty-eight countries, (4) at least eight systematic reviews of
the medical literature, (5) at least fifteen controlled trials, (6) at least fifty comparative
cohort studies or prospective case series, and (7) numerous well-designed retrospective
case series/reports comprising thousands of cases. Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of
Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOuS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 505, 538-
40(2011).
9 See, e.g., CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & MANAGEMENT (Robert M. Reece &
Cindy W. Christian eds., 3d ed. 2009); LORI FRASIER ET AL., ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN
INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE (Karen C.
Maurer et al. eds., 2006); JAMES A. MONTELEONE, CHILD MALTREATMENT: A CLINICAL
GUIDE AND REFERENCE (2d ed. 1998); INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA (Robert M.
Reece & Carol E. Nicholson eds., 2003); THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen Lazoritz & Vince Palusci eds., 2001); SHAKING
AND OTHER NON-ACCIDENTAL HEAD INJURIES IN CHILDREN (Robert A. Minns & J. Keith
Brown eds., 2005); Mark S. Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE 364 (Carole Jenny ed., 2010).
to See SHARYN E. PARKS ET AL., CTR FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
PEDIATRIC ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA: RECOMMENDED DEFINITIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE AND RESEARCH (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePreventi
on/pdf/PedHeadTrauma-a.pdf.
" See cases cited infra notes 47, 71; see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE
OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE: CHILD MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
RAPE, STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE (5th ed. 2011) (discussing the issues surrounding
expert medical testimony in this arena and citing numerous cases as examples).
12 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 4. For interesting speculations regarding Cavazos v. Smith in
the context of the Supreme Court's tendency to distrust the Ninth Circuit, see Vikram
David Amar, The Supreme Court's First Ruling of the New Term, Cavazos v. Smith:
Supreme Court Annoyance, the Ninth Circuit, and Summary Reversals, VERDICT (Nov. 11,
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/11/1 1/the-supreme-courts-first-ruling-of-the-new-
term-cavazos-v-smith.
'3 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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community 'over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone." 4
Because these three justices purport to describe the shifting opinion of the
"medical community," one might initially mistake this finding for a distillation of
the relevant medical literature on abusive head trauma/shaken baby syndrome
(AHT/SBS). " Nothing could be further from the truth. Instead the dissenters
engage in two different, significant, and interrelated jurisprudential errors.
The first jurisprudential error, which will be fully addressed in this Article, is
the dissenters' conclusion that few of the signs of SBS were present in this case
which misconstrues the medical and nonmedical evidence presented by the
prosecution and defense. The second is their sweeping conclusion that doubt has
increased within the medical community regarding SBS which is based on the
dissenters' careless and irresponsible independent extrarecord judicial fact-finding
and contradicted by over seven hundred AHT/SBS medical articles written over
the past four decades.16 Ignoring the overwhelming medical evidence, the justices
support their opinion with single-sentence quotations from seven cherry-picked
sources. This type of faux fact-finding, which perpetuates the false SBS
14 Id., at 9-10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590,
596 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)).
15 This Article refers to AHT/SBS because the American Academy of Pediatrics has
recently revised its own position paper on SBS to be more inclusive of the multiple
mechanisms by which AHT may be inflicted. See Cindy W. Christian & Robert W. Block,
Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1409-11 (2009)
(setting forth the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) position and noting that the
Academy determined it was necessary to modify the terminology for describing inflicted
head trauma to recognize the multiple mechanisms by which the spectrum of injuries could
be inflicted, including shaking, impact, a combination, and additional mechanisms).
Contrary to the representations made by many defense-retained witnesses and legal
academic commentators, the 2009 position statement does not do away with shaking as a
mechanism of injury but reaffirms it. According to the AAP, "Shaken baby syndrome is a
subset of AHT. Injuries induced by shaking and those caused by blunt trauma have the
potential to result in death or permanent neurologic disability" and "[t]he goal of this policy
statement is not to detract from shaking as a mechanism of AHT but to broaden the
terminology to account for the multitude of primary and secondary injuries that result from
AHT . . . ." Id. at 1409-10; see also Stephen Lazoritz et al., The Whiplash Shaken Infant
Syndrome: Has Caffey's Syndrome Changed or Have We Changed His Syndrome?, 21
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1009, 1010-13 (1997) (suggesting that in 1997 Dr. Caffey's
terminology and diagnostic criteria for "Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome" should be
changed to encompass broader understandings of the mechanisms of injury based on
medical research on the syndrome over the past twenty-five years).
16 This conclusion might logically follow because no amicus briefs were filed in the
Supreme Court and only one of the articles relied upon by the dissenters was cited in the
defendant's brief, suggesting that the dissenters conducted an independent analysis of the
extant medical literature. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 35, Cavazos v. Smith,
132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (No. 10-1115) (citing Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A
Biomechanics Analysis of Injury Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SC. INT'L 71, 71-79 (2005)).
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controversy, will be addressed in detail in a subsequent companion article.17 It is
enough to note here that the dissenters base their conclusion on a handful of
papers: (1) written by a tiny group of "mercenary scientists" whose regular
testimony as defense-retained witnesses in child abuse and child homicide cases
undermines the objectivity, legitimacy, and validity of their work;' 8 (2) that contain
little original research and instead reflect manipulation of data and statistical
methods,19 (i.e., opinibn pieces, nonrandomized retrospective case series/reports,
scientifically unsubstantiated opinions of other "mercenary" witnesses, and
mischaracterizations of earlier AHT/SBS research); 20 (3) written not for academic
and research purposes, but for use in legal proceedings; and (4) riddled with blatant
methodological flaws and discredited by pediatric expert medical research and
peer-reviewed scientific publications in a wide range of fields. 21 Although the
Smith dissenters could not garner a majority for their empirically unwarranted
assertions regarding the purportedly unsettled state of the science of AHT/SBS, the
scope and power of their view became undeniable on April 6, 2012. On that day,
California Governor Jerry Brown commuted Smith's sentence, echoing Justice
Ginsburg's conclusion that the AHT/SBS controversy made it "clear that
significant doubts surround Ms. Smith's conviction." 22
17 Joalle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the
Science: There Is No Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Controversy, 2013
UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming).
18 According to Dr. Daniel Lindberg of Brigham and Women's Hospital, the
AHT/SBS controversy has been manufactured based "exclusively on the opinions and
work of 'experts' who derive substantial income from lucrative court testimony on behalf
of the accused perpetrators of child abuse" and "rarely, if ever, provide medical care for
children." Carey Goldberg, The Real Consensus on Shaken Baby Syndrome?, WBUR's
COMMONHEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Sept. 27, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://commonhealth.wb
ur.org/2010/09/shaken-baby/; see also Narang, supra note 8, at 593-94 ("[T]he pecuniary
interest in providing expert testimony cannot be underestimated. It has posed and continues
to pose a significant risk to the presentation of unbiased medical information. . . . [1]n
addition to pecuniary interest, as discussed above, personal prejudices can also affect
scientific analysis. This can result in the adherence to disproven theories and the
presentation of skewed information."); Kenneth Feldman, Commentary on Congenital
Rickets Article, 39 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1127, 1128-29 (2009) (providing example of
pecuniary interests of repeat expert witnesses).
19 Ceccarelli, supra note 1, at 197.
20 Narang, supra note 8, at 541 (noting that all of the medical papers "'questioning'
the validity of AHT (save two or three) are non-randomized, retrospective case
series/reports, and Without comparative control groups. In fact, many are single case
reports.").
21 See Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 17; Sandeep Narang et al., A Daubert Analysis
of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, Part II: An Examination of the
Differential Diagnosis, 13 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2013).
22 Calif Gov. Commutes Shirley Ree Smith's Sentence in Shaken Baby Case,
CBSNEWS (April 6, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-
57410659-504083/calif-gov-commutes-shirley-ree-smiths-sentence-in-shaken-baby-case. It
is unclear what influence the multiple opinions of the Ninth Circuit and Justice Ginsburg's
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A. The Supreme Court Enters an Ongoing "Controversy"
The dissenters' conclusions and choice of sources were not novel. Their
findings echo the work of a small, partisan, and vocal group of law professors23
and law students 24 who have recently challenged the diagnostic validity of
AHT/SBS and advanced their own specious claims of a "scientific controversy."25
Justice Ginsburg notably did not cite any of these law review articles. However,
because her opinion closely mirrors these works, she grants an unwarranted
imprimatur of legitimacy to legal academic arguments that SBS "quite possibly
does not exist," 2 6 may be "junk science,"27 that "SBS science in its current
dissenting opinion may have had on Governor Brown's decision. The remaining sections of
this Article should clarify whether the medical and nonmedical evidence relied on (or
ignored) by the Ninth Circuit and the Smith Court's three dissenting justices actually raises
"significant doubts" about the guilt of the defendant.
23 Symposium, Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New
Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219 (2012); Keith A. Findley et al.,
Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 209 (2012); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby
Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L.
BULL. 156 (2010); Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby
Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project]; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent
Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby
Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2011) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent
Prosecution].
24 Rachel Burg, Note, Un-Convicting the Innocent: The Case for Shaken Baby
Syndrome Review Panels, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 657 (2012); Molly Gena, Comment,
Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts Doubts on Convictions, 2007 Wis. L.
REV. 701; Genie Lyons, Comment. & Note, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Questionable
Scientific Syndrome and a Dangerous Legal Concept, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1132
(asserting that "[fjor many years now, attorneys have been willing to prosecute, and juries
have been willing to convict, people whose only clearly established mistake was caring for
a baby that died"); Daniel G. Orenstein, Comment, Shaken to the Core: Emerging
Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 42
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2011); Lauren Quint, Note, Bridging the Gap: An Application of
Social Frameworks Evidence to Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1839 (2011). A
few defense practitioners have authored similar articles, which suffer from the same
shortcomings of selective, improper, or incomplete citation. See, e.g., Matthew D. Ramsey,
A Nuts and Bolts Approach to Litigating the Shaken Baby or Shaken Impact Syndrome, 188
MIL. L. REv. 1 (2006); Elizabeth A. Walker, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Daubert and MRE
702's Failure to Exclude Unreliable Scientific Evidence and the Need for Reform, 210 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (2011).
25 See infra Part II.C.
26 Lyons, supra note 24, at 1109.
27 Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 158 ("The question here is whether shaken baby
syndrome evidence is 'junk' science presenting an intolerable risk of a wrongful
conviction . ... ").
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conflicted state . . . does not support criminal convictions,"28 and that the medical
community has "deliberately discarded a diagnosis defined by shaking." 29 These
attention-grabbing claims fundamentally misconstrue and misstate the basic
science involved in the medical diagnosis of child abuse and the type of medical
expert testimony offered in legal proceedings. Like the Smith dissenters, law
professors and students who claim to have "ripped the lid off' the scandal of false
AHT/SBS convictions base their assertions on selective or improper citation to
outlier medical papers that: (1) rely on unscientific methods; (2) are written almost
exclusively by self-interested and highly-paid defense witnesses; and (3) ignore the
vast quantity of valid, easily accessible, evidence-based medical research and the
many public and professional statements that substantiate AHT/SBS as a clinically
valid diagnosis. 30
Supreme Court justices, law professors, and law students are generally not
scientists. As Professor Susan Haack astutely observed, when courts rely on
information beyond their ken they must assume that "[g]iven the investigative
character of the scientific enterprise and the pervasive reliance of individual
scientists on evidence discovered by others, the core values are honesty (both with
yourself and with other people) about what the evidence is and where it leads." 3'
Thus, especially when wading into a purported "controversy," courts should
hesitate before relying on any so-called child abuse "expert" whose public
statements include "[a]s far as I'm concerned, every goddamn conviction in this
country over the past 25 years which is based on testimony regarding shaking has
to be overturned,"32 inviting skepticism regarding the expert's accuracy, honesty,
and objectivity.
The problem of biased and scientifically unsound defense witness testimony
in the AHT/SBS context has increasingly aroused the attention of various medical
associations. For example, a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association described how legal cases involving AHT/SBS have been harmed by
28 Orenstein, supra note 24, at 1306.
29 Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 11.
30 See Narang, supra note 8, at 574-76 (listing organizations endorsing the validity of
AHT/SBS promulgated by the World Health Organization, the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the American Academy of Ophthalmology, the American Association for
Pediatric Ophthalmology and Strabismus, the American College of Radiology, the
American Academy of Family Physicians, the American College of Surgeons, the
American Association of Neurologic Surgeons, the Pediatric Orthopedic Society of North
America, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the American Academy of
Neurology, the Royal College of Pediatrics and Child Health, the Royal College of
Radiologists, the Royal College of Ophthalmologists, and the Canadian Pediatric Society).
31 Haack, supra note 1, at 998.
32 Patrick Yeagle, Caretaker or Killer? New Research on Shaken Baby Syndrome
Could Set Pamela Jacobazzi Free ILL. TIMES (May 5, 2011), http://www.illinoistimes.com
/Springfield/article-8622-caregiver-or-killer.html (quoting frequent defense medical
witness Dr. John Plunkett); see infra notes I10-121 and accompanying text (identifying the
bias of various defense witnesses and their own public pronouncements on the subject of
AHT/SBS).
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"physicians with variable credentials [who] have a willingness to disparage
scientifically grounded and accepted testimony, use unique theories of causation,
omit pertinent facts or knowledge, use unique or unusual interpretations of medical
findings, make false statements, or engage in flagrant misquoting of medical
journals."3 3 In a similar effort, physicians involved in the diagnosis and treatment
of AHT/SBS have recently called for new certification programs and specific rules
of ethical expert conduct that would "provide some degree of certainty that
physicians testifying both for the prosecution and defense as AHT medical experts
are indeed expert, experienced, and unbiased."3 4 In the interim, judges can use
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (or its state equivalent) to exclude or limit the
testimony of partisan experts who "have developed their opinions expressly for the
purposes of testifying."35
B. The AHT/SBS "Controversy" is False
Despite all the ballyhoo, there has been no paradigm shift in the scientific
support for the diagnosis of AHT/SBS. The empirical evidence includes a
continuously growing body of "evidence-based, peer-reviewed medical literature
with 40 years of contributions by pediatricians, neuroradiologists, clinical and
forensic pathologists, ophthalmologists, and physiologists clearly supporting the
construct of a medical diagnosis of AHT."36 At the clinical level, "[m]edical
experts agree with the physical, laboratory, and imaging findings associated with
the medical construct of AHT, which can include subdural hemorrhage, retinal
hemorrhage, encephalopathy, and often evidence of previous trauma or other
bodily injury."3 7
33 Daniel M. Albert et al., Ensuring Appropriate Expert Testimony for Cases
Involving the "Shaken Baby," 308 JAMA 39, 40 (2012).
34 Id.
35 FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir 1995)).
36 Albert et al., supra note 33, at 39. Neuropathologists, radiologists, hematologists,
and biomechanicians have also contributed to the literature in support of AHT/SBS. See
sources cited supra notes 8-9.
3 Albert et al., supra note 33, at 39; see also Sabine A. Maguire et al., Which Clinical
Features Distinguish Inflicted from Non-Inflicted Brain Injury? A Systematic Review, 94
ARCHIVES DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 860, 865-66 (2009) (noting the positive predictive value
of retinal hemorrhages and apnea in AHT, but explaining that, as in most cases of physical
child abuse, there is no diagnostic test for inflicted brain injury and the diagnosis is made
on the basis of probability after careful exclusion of other possible causes for the clinical
findings, including accidental injury and other medical conditions). Contrary to the
representations made by most defense witnesses and legal scholars challenging the
diagnosis of AHT/SBS, the diagnosis of this form of trauma is not made exclusively on the
basis of the triad of injuries, but instead as part of an extensive differential diagnostic
process that considers all aspects of the medical evaluation along with all of the
investigative information from other relevant nonmedical sources. See infra notes 61-64
and accompanying text.
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Of course, as with any area of science, the existence of extensive
substantiating medical evidence does not mean that every question has been
answered, that there are no areas of legitimate uncertainty, or that research should
not continue. But false claims of a scientific paradigm shift completely
mischaracterize the existing medical evidence. Law professors and students who
seek to analogize these claims to the false convictions uncovered using DNA
evidence38 embrace a false science and paradoxically reject the core lesson of the
Innocence Project-that good science makes good law.39
C. How False "Controversies" Create Real Problems
Unlike most of the academic arguments that consume legal scholars, 40 it is a
matter of life or death when judges who must decide child abuse cases mistake
biased, poorly substantiated, and outlier advocacy for legitimate medical
information.41 Proponents of the false AHT/SBS controversy transcend academic
discourse to undermine real world public health and child abuse prevention efforts
by suggesting that shaking an infant is not dangerous and cannot cause serious
injury.42 The flaws in Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion may not be obvious, so
38 See Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 2 (claiming that
her article "identifies a criminal justice crisis"); Burg, supra note 24, at 660 (suggesting
that the medical community has shifted towards skepticism of SBS, but that innocent
people continue to be falsely convicted on the basis of this scientifically questionable
diagnosis); Lyons, supra note 24, at 1132 ("For many years now, attorneys have been
willing to prosecute, and juries have been willing to convict, people whose only clearly
established mistake was caring for a baby that died."); Orenstein, supra note 24, at 1305-
07 (alleging that "the American criminal justice system ... [must] address concerns that
SBS theory has potentially sent wrongfully convicted persons to prison").
39 The vast majority of the exonerations secured by the Innocence Project have been
based on the legitimate science of DNA sampling and testing. Thus, the comparison
between the valid and widely accepted science of DNA analysis and outlier litigation-
driven challenges to the validity of AHT/SBS is especially inapt. Peter J. Neufeld, an
Innocence Project cofounder, has specifically bemoaned courts' reliance on specious
litigation-driven science and advocated for more stringent screening including more careful
application of the criteria outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993). See Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal
Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S1 07 (2005).
40 As Chief Justice John Roberts lamented in his June 2011 address to the Fourth
Circuit Judicial Conference, "Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first
article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches
in 18th century Bulgaria." Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. The Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J.
(Feb. 17, 2012, 7:12 CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/the-high bench-vs.
_theivory.
41 See infra notes 47, 69-71, 74, 81-91 and accompanying text (noting judicial
decisions on SBS).
42 See Christian & Block, supra note 15, at 1409-11 (setting forth the American
Academy of Pediatrics position paper on AHT and discussing the public health and
prevention efforts encouraged by the Academy to educate parents about the dangers of
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they must be corrected before these mistakes gain traction with future courts, the
media, and the public.
This correction must be prompt because incidences of AHT in children are
increasing. A new multicenter study reveals that the overall rate of AHT, which is
the leading cause of death from child abuse, has increased over 60%, from 8.9 to
14.7 per 100,000 children under five years old, over the past five years.43 The
current incidence of AIT in children under one year is 20 to 30 cases per 100,000,
with a fatality rate of 20% and a significant disability rate of 66%. As noted
above, the promulgation of scientifically unsubstantiated claims that shaking
cannot harm an infant sends a dangerous message to parents and caregivers and
undermines important child abuse prevention efforts.45
This correction must be accurate and empirically sound. As shown below, the
Smith dissent reveals how courts carelessly or inadvertently rely on
pseudoscientific information resoundingly rejected within multiple scientific
fields.4 6 This is more likely to occur when the court engages in its own fact finding
and especially when it fails to use valid and transparent source selection criteria.
These problems are compounded when brief quotations are excerpted without
attention to the remainder of the source (including the description of methods),
concurrent or subsequently published critical responses to the selected work, or
other articles on the same topic that reach different conclusions. It is vitally
important that future courts do not uncritically rely on the Smith dissent, or the
sources cited therein, to make similar unscientific mistakes.
This correction must be clear and accessible to nonscientists. In a growing
number of child homicide and abuse cases involving a medical diagnosis of
AHT/SBS (based on clear clinical findings and extensive medical research),
scientific-sounding information of dubious validity has increasingly been paraded
before trial courts and offered to support postconviction claims of "factual
innocence" or "newly discovered evidence."A7 Ironically, this may be attributed, in
shaking); Mark S. Dias et al., Preventing Abusive Head Trauma Among Infants and Young
Children: A Hospital-Based, Parent Education Program, 115 PEDIATRICS e470, e470-e477
(2005) (documenting success in the reduction of AHT through hospital-based education
programs regarding SBS in several regions of New York over a five-year time period).
43 Rachel P. Berger et al., Abusive Head Trauma During a Time of Increased
Unemployment: A Multicenter Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS 637, 637-42 (2011) (noting that
similar findings in other parts of the country would correlate to hundreds or thousands of
additional AHT cases); see Liz Szabo, Recession Linked to Increase in Shaken Baby
Syndrome, USA TODAY (May 3, 2010, 1:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2
0l0-05-03-abuse03_STN.htm; Incidence of Child Abuse Skyrocketed During Recent
Recession, Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC-led Study Finds, CHILDREN'S
Hosp. PITTSBURGH (May 10, 2010), http://www.chp.edu/CHP/0501 10.
4 See Albert et al., supra note 33, at 39.
4s See supra note 42 (detailing recent prevention efforts).
46 See infra Part I1I.E.
47 See, e.g., Flick v. Warren, 465 F. App'x 461, 464-65 (6th Cir. 2012) (denial of
habeas alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge prosecution
testimony involving SBS and failure to obtain defense expert); .Grant v. Warden, No.
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part, to the Daubert standard, which encourages judges to consider publication as a
measure of scientific validity. The problem is that judges mistake publication in
any medical journal for a determination that the author has used scientifically
sound methods to reach valid conclusions. What courts routinely fail to understand
is that not all medical journals are the same, running the gamut from prestigious
peer-reviewed journals to undiscriminating pay-to-publish outlets. More
importantly, even well regarded journals will sometimes publish an article that
presents an outlier view specifically to expose the article to critique from others in
the field.48
TSRCVO30004233S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1402, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 4,
2008) (same); Day v. State, 303 P.3d 291, 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (upholding
admissibility of expert testimony regarding SBS while acknowledging that the record
reflected a disagreement among experts about the underlying science); In re Brooks, 138
Wash. App. 1005, 2007 WL 1129655 at *1 (2007) (unpublished table decision) (denial of
restraint petition alleging newly discovered evidence involving medical research allegedly
supporting alternative theories for head injuries); State v. Louis, 798 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (granting new trial based on inaccurate defense
representations of shifts in science and newly discovered evidence); State v. Edmunds, 746
N.W.2d 590, 598-99 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (granting relief on claims of newly discovered
evidence, rather than insufficient evidence).
48 For a recent concrete example of an outlier theory published along with critical
responses, see Kathy A. Keller & Patrick D. Barnes, Rickets vs. Abuse: A National and
International Epidemic, 38 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1210 (2008) (proposing that
"congenital rickets" could account for multiple fractures in several alleged child abuse
cases). That article was published not as an accepted peer-reviewed article but instead as a
"comment" along with invited critiques from numerous other doctors and the editors of the
journal in which it was published. Id.; see, e.g., Thomas L. Slovis & Stephen Chapman,
Vitamin D Insufficiency/Deficiency-A Conundrum, 38 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1153
(2008); Thomas L. Slovis & Stephen Chapman, Evaluating the Data Concerning Vitamin
D Insufficiency/Deficiency and Child Abuse, 38 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1221 (2008)
(providing the editor's comments about the lack of scientific support for the conclusions
made by Drs. Keller and Barnes); Carole Jenny, Rickets or Abuse?, 38 PEDIATRIC
RADIOLOGY 1219 (2008) (criticizing the methodology used by Drs. Barnes and Keller and
their selection bias based on their extensive experience as expert witnesses); Feldman,
supra note 18, at 1127 (noting that several cases presented by Drs. Barnes and Keller
contained significant omissions, including findings not seen by several other radiologists
who reviewed the films and the authors' failure to disclose their role as defense experts
who routinely testify in cases where this defense is advanced).
Although the focus of this Article is the diagnosis of AHT/SBS, similar problems
arise in child abuse and child homicide cases involving different types of injuries. See, e.g.,
Joille Anne Moreno, Einstein on the Bench?: Exposing What Judges Do Not Know About
Science and Using Child Abuse Cases to Improve How Courts Evaluate Scientific
Evidence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 531, 535-36 (2003) (exploring the unscientific diagnosis of
"temporary brittle bone disease" offered by defense witnesses to explain fracture injuries in
children). In a recent child abuse trial in San Diego involving multiple fractures to a baby,
Dr. Patrick Barnes testified for the defendant and attributed the child's injuries to
congenital rickets. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 12-13, People v. Sanders,
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Finally, this correction must embrace both the science and law of AHT/SBS.
In many AHT cases, including the Smith case, the defendant makes admissions to
medical professionals, social services personnel, or to the police. There is a
substantial and growing body of research demonstrating that incriminating
statements and confessions (made to family members, doctors, social service
personnel, or police officers) often describe a mechanism of injury that is
consistent with the clinical findings, thereby confirming the medical evidence.4 9
But some law professors have recently argued that defendant confessions and
admissions should be ignored because such statements are the product of a
pervasive child abuse prosecution bias.o Despite the lack of any evidence to
support this "bias," one medical author (cited approvingly by the Smith dissenters),
simply states that incriminating statements and confessions in AHT/SBS cases are
inherently unreliable and should be irrelevant to any determination of causation.
While arguments regarding cognitive biases are a recent academic fad, it is
ridiculous to posit that every medical professional, social worker, law enforcement
personnel, or anyone else to whom a child abuse/homicide suspect makes
incriminating statements is so tainted by a pro-prosecution bias that they are blind
to all other evidence and cannot exercise independent judgment.
As discussed below, before Smith, most courts accurately concluded that the
diagnosis of AHT/SBS is supported by extensive valid relevant medical evidence
and is generally accepted in the relevant medical community.52 The Smith dissent,
which provides a model for examining the above-described problems in detail and
No. SCD 226563 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011) (testimony of Dr. Patrick Barnes) (on file
with authors). Dr. Barnes supported his testimony with an article he wrote with his wife. Id.
at 75 (referencing Keller & Barnes, supra, at 1210-16). Dr. Barnes represented to the court
that his article had been published in a peer-reviewed journal, which was true. Dr. Barnes
failed to inform the court, however, that the article had not been peer-reviewed because it
was published as a "commentary." Dr. Barnes also failed to acknowledge that the article
had been subjected to extensive written critique from numerous other doctors and from the
editors of the journal in which it was published. See id. at 12-13.
49 See, e.g., Catherine Adamsbaum et al., Abusive Head Trauma: Judicial Admissions
Highlight Violent and Repetitive Shaking, 126 PEDIATRICS 546, 550, 554 (2010); Suzanne
P. Starling et al., Abusive Head Trauma: The Relationship ofPerpetrators to Their Victims,
95 PEDIATRICS 259, 261 (1995) [hereinafter Starling et al., Abusive Head Trauma];
Suzanne P. Starling et al., Analysis of Perpetrator Admissions to Inflicted Traumatic Brain
Injury in Children, 158 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 454, 456-57 (2004)
[hereinafter Starling et al., Analysis ofPerpetrator Admissions].
5o See, e.g., Keith Findley, Clinical Professor, Presentation at Twelfth International
Conference on Shaken Baby Syndrome / Abusive Head Trauma: What Role Should
Confessions Play in Diagnosing Abusive Head Trauma? (Oct. 1, 2012); see also
Symposium, supra note 23, at 232 (statement of Professor Keith Findley) (proposing that
confessions and adjudications are not reliable for supporting the "hypothesis" of SBS).
' See, e.g., Jan E. Leestma, "Shaken Baby Syndrome": Do Confessions by Alleged
Perpetrators Validate the Concept?, 11 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 14, 14-15.
52 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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context, if uncorrected, will redound to the lower courts and distort public
awareness and opinion regarding AHT/SBS. 53
D. An Evidence-Based Approach to AHT/SBS
It is against this backdrop of increasing incidence of child abuse and child
homicide, decreasing understanding of the clinical diagnostic criteria and medical
literature, and a deliberate effort to politicize AHT/SBS by mischaracterizing it as
prosecutorial overreaching that this Article proposes an evidence-based approach
to these interdependent scientific and legal questions.
Evidence-based medicine is a widely used and commonly misunderstood
concept. According to Dr. David Sackett, the originator of the concept, "[e]vidence
based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of
evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research." 54 This Article's
approach adopts the fundamental principle of evidence-based review, which is that
not all evidence is of equal validity. Thus, in Smith we compare the clinical
experience of the five diagnosing physicians and examine whether their methods
and conclusions are consistent with the evidence base that supports the accuracy of
the AHT/SBS diagnosis. This methodology is a direct response to the Smith
dissenters' myopic review of the facts, which implicitly endorses efforts to
"misrepresent the state of knowledge in the medical community regarding the
reality of child abuse, and, in particular, AHT/SBS."" This methodology also
" See infra Part 11.8 (discussing State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008)).
54 David Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't, 312
BMJ 71 (1996).
5 Goldberg, supra note 18 (including a comment from Lucy B. Rorke-Adams, M.D.,
Senior Neuropathologist, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, Consultant
Neuropathologist, Office of the Medical Examiner of Philadelphia). Dr. Rorke-Adams
continued,
There has been a growing body of well-done scientific work confirming the
various aspects of this syndrome, specifically, the pathogenesis of subdural
hematomas, the nature of the retinal hemorrhages and more serious retinal
injury, the pathophysiology of the concussion which results from shaking, the
reality of the severe spinal cord injury[,] etc. It is well-recognized that there may
be mimics of SBS and physicians dealing with the clinical and pathological
diagnosis of babies presenting with signs of abuse meticulously explore all other
possibilities before concluding that the illness or death is not a consequence of
natural causes.
The small number of "experts" who challenge this enormous body of
evidence are, for the most part, not involved in the day-to-day practice of
pediatrics, neurosurgery or pediatric forensic pathology/neuropathology.
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reclaims and clarifies the evidence-based approach by identifying the Smith
dissenters' unwarranted reliance on work that purports to be "evidence-based," but
is not.
Toward this end, Part II provides a brief historical perspective on the genesis
of the false AHT/SBS controversy. Part III addresses how the dissenting justices
distorted the medical evidence introduced by the prosecution and the defense and
provides an evidence-based response to each of the five specific "problems" with
the medical evidence identified by the Smith dissenters. Part IV examines how the
Supreme Court justices who dissented in Smith also misinterpreted the nonmedical
evidence introduced at trial. Finally, the conclusion identifies the Smith dissent as
an example of the more general "tail wagging the dog" problem that arises during
postconviction review when judges fail to properly apply the legal standard, and
opt instead to engage in extrarecord fact-finding used to support the speculation
that a conviction was wrongful. A companion article explores the additional and
more general problems created by the Smith dissenters' independent review of the
medical literature.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FALSE AHT/SBS "CONTROVERSY"
A thorough examination of the history of the false AHT/SBS controversy is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is helpful, however, to explore the critical
events that brought us to where we are today.
As noted above, the original articles recognizing SBS were published in the
early 1970s.58 Since then, the empirical evidence supporting the validity of the
AHT/SBS diagnosis has grown to include a body of "evidence-based, peer-
reviewed medical literature with 40 years of contributions by pediatricians,
neuroradiologists, clinical and forensic pathologists, ophthalmologists, and
physiologists clearly supporting the construct of a medical diagnosis for AHT.""
At the clinical level, "[m]edical experts agree with the physical, laboratory,
and imaging findings associated with the medical construct of AHT, which can
include subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, encephalopathy, and often
evidence of previous trauma or other bodily injury." 6 0 Contrary to the inaccurate
representations regularly made by many defense-retained medical witness and
legal academics, an AHT/SBS diagnosis is not the automatic result of the so-called
triad of injury findings.6 Instead, it is the product of an extensive differential
Rorke-Adams, Comment to Goldberg, supra note 18.
56 See Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 24 AM.
J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 239 (2003); infra text accompanying note 114.
5 See Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 17.
58 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
5 Albert et al., supra note 33 at 39.
60 Id.
61 In the opinion of the Medill Innocence Project and Professor Alec Klein, "If the
classic triad of shaken-baby syndrome symptoms is present-retinal bleeding, brain
swelling and brain bleeding-it is often assumed that a caregiver caused them. But science
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diagnostic process that considers all aspects of the medical evaluation (i.e., clinical
evaluation, clinical history, diagnostic and laboratory testing, evidence of cerebral
trauma, evidence of ocular trauma, imaging studies, evidence of additional injuries,
and, in the event of death, pathology and autopsy results) along with all of the
investigative information provided by relevant nonmedical sources.62 Thus, the
repeated law professor/law student complaint that criminal convictions are based
exclusively on so-called triad evidence is false. 63 More recent academic claims that
has evolved and some of the assumptions are being challenged." Rethinking Shaken Baby
Syndrome Convictions: Medill Innocence Project Begins Investigating Potential
Miscarriages ofJustice, Nw. UNIV. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscent
er/stories/20 12/1 0/rethinking-shaken-baby-syndrome-convictions.html; see also
Symposium, supra note 23, at 222-23 (statement of Professor Keith Findley) (asserting
that the traditional theory is that the triad is caused exclusively by shaking and is used to
establish all the elements of the crime, and agreeing with Professor Tuerkheimer's
assertion that the traditional theory amounts to "medically diagnosed murder");
Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 6-18 (claiming the medical
diagnosis of SBS and criminal convictions are based almost exclusively on the triad);
Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution, supra note 23 at 515 (claiming "the classic
formulation of SBS is based exclusively on the diagnostic 'triad"').
62 See Maguire et al., supra note 37 (noting the positive predictive value of retinal
hemorrhages and apnea in AHT, but explaining that, as in all cases of physical child abuse,
there is no diagnostic test for inflicted brain injury and the diagnosis is made on the basis of
probability after careful exclusion of other possible causes for the clinical findings
including accidental injury and other medical conditions). For an excellent discussion of
the differential diagnostic process engaged in by medical professionals, and the
consideration of alternative causes, see Stephen C. Boos, Abusive Head Trauma as a
Medical Diagnosis, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL,
LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 49; Andrew P. Sirontak, Medical
Disorders that Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND
CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE, supra, at 191. This differential
diagnostic process is not new and has been well described for over two decades. See
generally Carolyn J. Levitt, Wilbur L. Smith & Randell C. Alexander, Abusive Head
Trauma, in CHILD ABUSE, MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 1-23 (Robert M.
Reece ed., 1994) (describing the differential diagnostic process).
63 See Symposium, supra note 23, at 224-25 (statement of Professor Keith Findley);
Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining that "[w]ith rare
exception, the case turns on the testimony of medical experts" and "SBS comes as close as
one could imagine to a medical diagnosis of murder: prosecutors use it to prove the
mechanism of death, the intent to harm, and the identity of the killer" because "all elements
of the crime-mens rea and actus reus (which includes both the act itself and causation of
the resulting harm)-are proven by the science"). These are strong allegations, which make
it surprising that the only support provided by Professor Tuerkheimer is a citation to two
cases, neither of which represents a triad-only prosecution. See Tuerkheimer, The Next
Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 7 (citing Mitchell v. State, No. CACR 07-472, 2008
WL 316166, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008), and State v. Edmunds, 598 N.W.2d 290,
293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)). Professor Findley also mischaracterizes Edmunds as a triad-
based prosecution, see Symposium, supra note 23, at 224 (statement of Professor Keith
Findley), despite the fact that having handled her postconviction petition he is well aware
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pediatricians and emergency room physicians who diagnose AHT/SBS are tainted
by a "prosecution bias" are empirically unsupportable, a transparent attempt to
garner attention with faddish behavioral science jargon, and patently absurd. 4
A. Commonwealth v. Woodward 6 5
In 1997, Louise Woodward's prosecution brought the term "shaken baby
syndrome" into the national spotlight. The highly publicized case of the English au
pair who fatally shook and slammed eight-month-old Matthew Eappen brought
international public attention to the reality of infant AHT. The hotly contested trial
also brought national attention to the use of highly paid defense medical witnesses
to challenge the accuracy of a child abuse diagnosis and to advance outlier and
highly controversial "alternative theories" of causation that purport to explain
traumatic or fatal infant injuries including, in this case, a two-inch skull fracture.
Woodward marks the origin of the false AHT/SBS controversy-at least in part
because the defendant, who was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury, was
later freed by the judge.66 This fact alone could explain the resulting public
uncertainty regarding the weight of the prosecution's medical evidence.
of the extensive additional evidence of Edmunds's guilt, including evidence that she was
previously witnessed assaulting another child in her care, Edmunds's own inculpatory trial
testimony, and the medical evidence of impact injury. See Edmunds v. Deppisch, 313 F.3d
997 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1066 (2003) (commenting on the findings made
by the trial judge on this issue). See also infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text
noting Professor Tuerkheimer's erroneous assertions in this regard. Brian Holmgren, a
coauthor on this Article, has twenty-five years of experience prosecuting child abuse cases.
He has never prosecuted a triad-only case and has yet to find one reported in the appellate
reports.
64 Symposium, supra note 23, at 232-33 (statement of Professor Keith Findley)
(arguing that doctors make two types of proprosecution mistakes: (1) "selection bias"
mistakes when they consider confession evidence as relevant to an abuse diagnosis, and (2)
"observer bias" mistakes because doctors, in their view, prefer to diagnose abuse and
"you're more likely to see something when you want to see it"); Tuerkheimer, The Next
Innocence Project, supra note 23 at 6 (claiming the medical diagnosis of SBS has been
"corrupted by a too-close medical-legal nexus").
65 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 449, No. 970433, 1997 WL 694119 (Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997),
aff'd, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998).
66 Carey Goldberg, Massachusetts High Court Backs Freeing Au Pair in Baby's
Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at Al. At trial, the prosecutor in the Woodward case
challenged Judge Hiller Zoebel's reduction of Woodward's second degree murder
conviction to manslaughter, the lighter associated sentence allowed her to return to
England. The prosecution alleged judicial bias, in part based on the fact that prior to the
trial, Judge Zoebel inappropriately proposed that the prosecutor offer a plea to
manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1277 (Mass. 1998).
But the sentence reduction does not imply that Woodward did not cause the injuries or
death of Matthew Eapen, or that the prosecution's medical proof was questionable. Id.
(setting forth Judge Zoebel's reasons for denying Woodward's motion for acquittal and a
new trial).
2013] FALSE "SCIENTIFIC" CONTROVERSY OVER SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 169
Irresponsible journalists, however, including Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes,
exacerbated the confusion. 67
The public confusion that began with Woodward has been transformed into an
apparent AHT/SBS "controversy" by some of the doctors who testified in
Woodward68 who, along with a handful of others, have spent the past fifteen years
providing a plethora of defense-supported medical challenges in child homicide
and child abuse cases. These include contesting the admission of the diagnosis of
AHT/SBS in pretrial hearings, Daubert/Frye evidentiary challenges, 69 the
increased use of medical witnesses to testify to outlier or unsubstantiated causation
theories at trial, and a concomitant increase in postconviction challenges based on
claims of a paradigm shift in the medical community. 70 To date, most courts have
accurately concluded that the diagnosis of AHT/SBS is supported by valid medical
evidence and is generally accepted in the relevant medical community.7 1 To our
See Bill Carter, Media Talk; Irate Boston Media Fault '60 Minutes' For Nanny
Report, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999, at C9. In March 1998, following Louise Woodward's
conviction, Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes broadcast an interview with Dr. Floyd Gillis,
which included the doctor's opinion that Matthew Eappen did not die of AHT/SBS, but
instead was strangled to death, an opinion offered by none of the witnesses at trial. Id. Mr.
Wallace failed to disclose, however, that Dr. Gillis's opinion was based on the opinion of
Dr. Marvin Nelson-a paid consultant for the defense in the Woodward case. Id. Thus,
Mike Wallace's misleading report directly contributed to the growing national confusion
regarding the validity of the medical evidence offered to support the AHT/SBS diagnosis
that had been presented at trial. Id. For published discussion of those medical findings, see
Patrick D. Barnes & Caroline D. Robson, CT Findings in Hyperacute Nonaccidental Brain
Injury, 30 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 74, 75-80 (2000) [hereinafter Barnes & Robson, CT
Findings]; Patrick D. Barnes & Caroline D. Robson, An Unresponsive Infant in the
Emergency Room, 6 SEMINARS IN PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 225, 225-27 (1999). Dr. Barnes
was a prosecution expert at Woodward's trial and these papers discuss the medical findings
from the case. For an expression of the medical consensus on these injuries and a response
to the proffered claims of the defense witnesses at the Woodward trial, see David L.
Chadwick et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome-A Forensic Pediatric Response, 101 PEDIATRICS
321, 321-23 (1998) (critiquing the accuracy of medical testimony provided by defense
witnesses during the Woodward trial and signed by over seventy physicians).
Two of these doctors are Dr. Jan Leestma and Dr. Ronald Uscinski, who have been
frequent defense witnesses since Woodward and whose papers are cited by the Smith
dissenters. See Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 17 (discussing the controversial positions
and testimony of Drs. Leestma and Uscinski).
69 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 290 S.W.3d 59, 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008)
(reversing the trial court's exclusion of testimony on SBS following a Daubert hearing at
which Dr. Ronald Uscinski testified for the defense and challenged the scientific reliability
of SBS); Transcript of Motion Hearing at 5-51, State v. Mendoza, No. 071908696 (Utah
Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 2008) (testimony of Dr. Janice Ophoven) (supporting a motion to
exclude an SBS diagnosis on Daubert grounds).
70 State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 592-93, 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
71 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, No. CACR 07-472, 2008 WL 316166, at *3 (Ark. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2008) (rejecting the defense claim that a Daubert hearing was required before
testimony on SBS may be admitted); Grant v. Warden, No. TSRCVO30004233S, 2008
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knowledge, not a single appellate court has rejected evidence of AHT/SBS as
scientifically unreliable under the Daubert or Frye evidentiary standard-an
outcome one would expect if the science was truly unsound.
At least one trial judge with extensive experience in child abuse cases has
opined that witnesses (and even legal academics) who misrepresent the AHT/SBS
medical evidence create real problems for the courts.72 According to Judge Gill, "It
is disconcerting, if not frightening, when a law professor professes factual,
technical, and legal misleading statements in public and professional
publications." The Smith dissent has the capacity to create far greater problems as
the most influential, if not the first, appellate decision to endorse the false
AHT/SBS controversy.74
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1402, at *35-36 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2008) (noting that the
Connecticut Supreme Court found that SBS satisfied the Frye standard in 1988); People v.
Armstrong, 919 N.E.2d 57 (1ll. App. Ct. 2009) (agreeing with the trial court findings that
SBS is generally accepted in the medical field based on prior decisions and that evidence of
SBS is admissible at trial); Middleton v. State, 980 So. 2d 351, 356 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
(rejecting defendant's claim that the relevant medical community does not generally accept
SBS and noting the acceptance of this diagnosis by other courts); State v. Leibhart, 662
N.W.2d 618, 627-28 (Neb. 2003) (finding that SBS is reliable under Daubert); State v.
Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390, 393 (S.C. 1991) (recognizing SBS as an extensively researched and
accepted medical diagnosis in other jurisdictions). The Warden court referenced State v.
McClary, 541 A.2d 96, 102 (Conn. 1988), which had also noted acceptance by six other
states. Warden, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1402, at *36; see Lutze v. Sherry, No. 07-
11227, 2008 WL 2397640, at *11, *14 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2008) (agreeing with the state
trial court that "SBS has been a valid recognized medical diagnosis based on scientific
evidence"); People v. Renteria, No. F045737, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8834, at *20-
21 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2005) (allowing testimony of medical experts on SBS, despite
being an "inexact science"); State v. Woodson, No. 85727, 2005 WL 2789082, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005) (recognizing that case law establishes that SBS is within the
medically accepted literature and has been admitted in courtrooms in the state and
nationwide); State v. Vandemark, No. CR.A. 04-01-0225, 2004 WL 2746157, at *3 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2004) (recognizing that the science behind SBS has been accepted in
almost every jurisdiction and is generally accepted in pediatrics); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d
602, 606-08 (Colo. App. 2001) (upholding trial court's admission of SBS evidence).
72 See Goldberg, supra note 18.
7 Charles Gill, Comment to Goldberg, supra note 18.
74 See infra Part 1.B (discussing Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 590); see also People v.
Rector, 226 P.3d 1170, 1173-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), rev'd, 248 P.3d 1196 (Colo. 2011)
(reversing because trial judge failed to conduct hearing to determine whether doctor's
testimony on nonaccidental head trauma was based on reliable scientific principles, failing
to appropriately consider holding in People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2003)
approving similar testimony); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that it was error to permit testimony on SBS without first conducting a
Daubert hearing because no Kentucky case had specifically determined it was a reliable
theory); State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1114-16 (N.M. 2008) (reversing conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel claim for defense attorney's failure to get an
expert to support defense that a five-week-old baby fell off couch and citing defense expert
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B. State v. Edmunds 75
Seven years ago, Professor Keith Findley enlisted the help of Wisconsin
Innocence Project students in his effort to seek postconviction review for Audrey
A. Edmunds.7 Edmunds had been convicted of reckless homicide based on
evidence that seven-month-old Natalie Beard suffered both shaking and impact
head trauma while in the defendant's care.n Her conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal,78 and her subsequent federal habeas petition was denied.79 In 2006, she
filed a motion for a new trial asserting "there were significant developments in the
medical community around 'shaken baby syndrome' in the ten years since her trial
that amounted to newly discovered evidence." 80 In support of this petition,
Edmunds presented affidavits and testimony from several medical witnesses81 who
claimed that the science of AHT/SBS had "changed" since the time of her trial and
now supported alternative theories of causation for many of the medical findings
relied upon by the jury.8 2 The trial judge, Daniel Moeser, denied Edmunds' petition
holding that, although some of the defense medical witnesses were "credible," the
medical science supporting the conviction was, if anything, stronger a decade later,
and that evidence of the defendant's guilt was extensive. Judge Moeser detailed
his findings in an extensive written order.84
testimony in other cases and inapplicable defense literature as support for holding); State v.
Louis, 798 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (upholding trial
court's order for new trial based on erroneous determinations by the trial and appellate
court "that medical community is sharply divided" on diagnostic findings for AHT).
746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
76 See id. at 592. In fact, Judge Dykman, writing for the court, actually thanks the
Wisconsin law school students by name in the text of the decision. Id. at 592 n.1.
7 See id.
78 State v. Edmunds, 598 N.W. 2d 290, 299 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
79 See Edmunds v. Deppisch, 313 F.3d 997, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2002).
80 Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 593.
81 See id. Edmunds presented affidavits and testimony from the following defense
medical witnesses (none of whom regularly treat infants with traumatic injuries): Dr.
Patrick Barnes (a pediatric neuroradiologist), Dr. Horace Gardner (a retired military
ophthalmologist), Dr. John Galaznik (a university health services physician), Dr. Peter
Stephens (a forensic pathologist), and Dr. George Nichols (a forensic pathologist).
Edmunds also presented evidence from the original medical examiner, Dr. Robert
Huntington, who apparently had modified his position on the potential timing of Natalie's
fatal head injuries but maintained that her cause of death was AHT. See id.
82 Id. The state court summarized the defense testimony as arguing that "there is now
a significant debate in the medical community as to whether Natalie's symptoms were
necessarily indicative of shaking or shaking combined with head trauma in infants. The
experts explained that there was not a significant debate about this issue in the mid-1990s
and that the opinions offered in Edmunds's first postconviction motion would have been
considered minority or fringe medical opinions." Id.
3 See State v. Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007).
84 See id.
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed Judge Moeser, finding that
Edmunds was entitled to a new trial because the "newly discovered evidence in
this case shows that there has been a shift in mainstream medical opinion since the
time of Edmunds's trial as to the causes of the types of trauma Natalie exhibited."
According to the court of appeals, Judge Moeser erred because he "expressly
found that Edmunds'[s] new evidence and the State's new evidence were both
credible . . . [and] then weighed the evidence and concluded that the State's
evidence was stronger."86 The court of appeals held that "it was not the [trial]
court's role to weigh the evidence . . . it was required to determine whether there
was a reasonable probability that a jury, hearing all the medical evidence, would
have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds's guilt."8 7 Thus, the court of appeals's
narrow and technical ruling was based solely on speculation that "a jury could
have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt even if the State's evidence is
stronger," so Edmunds was entitled to a new trial.
A thorough discussion of Edmunds is beyond the scope of this Article, but
because this case is invariably cited as evidence that courts are starting to reject the
science of AHT/SBS, some clarification is required. The trial judge's opinion that
a few defense witnesses were "credible" provides the only support for the
sweeping and erroneous conclusion by the appellate court that "newly discovered
evidence in this case shows that there has been a shift in mainstream medical
opinion," 90 which in turn, presages the similarly erroneous conclusion of the Smith
dissenters. This conclusion must be understood in context as the ipse dixit of a few
defense witnesses who testified in Edmunds's post-conviction hearing for the
purpose of advancing self-serving (but empirically unsupportable) claims that a
shift in "mainstream medical opinion" is underway.
Edmunds should not be misunderstood as heralding a significant change in
medical opinion on SBS/AHT. The mere fact that a single state court judge found a
" Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 598-99.
86 Id. at 597.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 599. Of course, this ruling was made under the court's unique interpretation
of Wisconsin's procedural rules for postconviction petitions alleging "newly discovered
evidence." Thus, this ruling has little or no precedential value for other jurisdictions that
use different rules. Moreover, the Wisconsin rules create an odd outcome by mandating
that any time a trial court determines that a defendant's postconviction "expert" is credible,
or even that the evidence presented by the state is stronger, a new trial is required. The
problems created by these state rules should be readily apparent to anyone familiar with
postconviction litigation-especially in AHT/SBS cases. They were certainly obvious to
the judge in Grant v. Warden, No. TSRCVO30004233S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1402
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2008), who immediately after Edmunds opined that "[t]he
Edmunds case presents a potential quagmire of epic proportions: the strong likelihood of
constant renewed prosecution and relitigation of criminal charges as expert opinion
changes and/or evolves over time" and that "the strong interest in the finality of judgments
is significantly undermined by reasoning employed by the Edmunds court." Id. at *2 n. 1.
90 Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 598-99.
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small group of doctors (of whom only one was actively engaged in the diagnosis of
child abuse) "credible" is not evidence of a paradigm shift-especially when the
judge's opinion is contradicted by four decades of scientific consensus on the
AHT/SBS diagnosis across a wide range of pediatric medical subspecialties and
countless physicians who are more credible because they actually diagnose abuse
as part of their clinical medical practice. The extensive biomechanical research on
infant head trauma also provides sound additional reasons to suspect the accuracy
of Judge Moeser's credibility conclusion.91
91 For example, several of the purportedly credible defense witnesses testified that
shaking alone could not have caused Natalie's injuries and that biomechanics research did
not support the SBS diagnosis. See, e.g., Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day 1) at 29-
30, 37, State v. Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1997) (testimony of Dr. Patrick
Barnes); Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day 2) at 133-35, 147-48, State v. Edmunds,
No. 96-CF-555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1997) (testimony of Dr. George Nichols). This evidence
should not have confirmed the witnesses' credibility, but should instead have raised
concerns for three reasons. First, Natalie had evidence of blunt impact trauma to her head,
making her case not a "shaking alone" case, but a "shaking plus impact" case, which (as
the defense witnesses surely must have known but opted not to share with the court) made
these biomechanics arguments irrelevant. Second, because the biomechanics literature
predated Edmunds's trial, it was not "newly discovered evidence." See generally Ann-
Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological and
Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409 (1987) (reviewing forty-eight cases of
infants and young children with SBS, including scans showing brain hemorrhaging,
subdural or subarachnoid hemorrhaging, autopsies, and reporting on various biomechanical
experiments of shaking and impact with a surrogate infant). Third, none of the well-
documented critiques of the biomechanical research were acknowledged or addressed by
the defense witnesses. See generally SHAKING AND OTHER NONACCIDENTAL HEAD
INJURIES IN CHILDREN (Robert A. Minns & J. Keith Brown eds., 2005) (summarizing
multiple limitations regarding Dr. Duhaime's conclusions and listing contrary clinical and
biomechanical evidence); C.Z. Cory & M.D. Jones, Can Shaking Alone Cause Fatal Brain
Injury?: A Biomechanical Assessment of the Duhaime Shaken Baby Syndrome Model, 43
MED. SCI. & L. 317 (2003) (discussing the Duhaime model and concluding "[t]here must
now be sufficient doubt in the reliability of the Duhaime et al. (1987) biomechanical study
to warrant the exclusion of such testimony in cases of suspected shaken baby syndrome.");
D.R. Wolfson et al., Rigid-Body Modelling of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 219 J. ENGINEERING
MED. 63 (2005) (discussing the use of rigid-body modeling to investigate neck stiffness on
head motion and head-torso impacts as a possible mechanism of injury). In addition,
defense witnesses opined that if Natalie were shaken violently, she should have sustained
neck injuries, see Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing (Day 2), supra, at 153 (testimony of
Dr. George Nichols), an outlier view supported by a single paper rife with methodological
errors and the subject of extensive scathing criticism. See also supra note 17 (discussing
critiques of Bandak, supra note 16). Finally, the defense witnesses' credibility should have
been further undermined by the fact that they proposed numerous alternative theories to
explain Natalie's injuries (i.e., a dysphagic choking episode, a "rebleed" of a prior subdural
hematoma, irritation of her respiratory centers from a subarachnoid hemorrhage, hypoxia),
see id., despite the fact that these theories could not accurately account for Natalie's
injuries, they were radically divergent and logically inconsistent, and none were
substantiated by accepted medical literature.
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C. Law Professors and Students Add to the Growing Confusion
If Woodward marks the advent of public awareness and confusion regarding
AHT/SBS, Edmunds marks the tipping point for the new false controversy.92
Starting in 2009, a small group of law professors 93 and law students 94 began to
advance the view that wrongful convictions in child homicide and child abuse
cases were creating a "criminal justice crisis."95
Law professors' and students' recent self-serving attempts to garner attention
with arguments that AHT/SBS "quite possibly does not exist," 96 may be "junk
science," 97 that "SBS science in its current conflicted state . . . does not support
criminal convictions," 98 and that the medical community has "deliberately
discarded a diagnosis defined by shaking," 99 have provoked extensive criticism
from all corners of the pediatric medical community. According to Allison Scobie-
Carroll, program director for the child protection program at Children's Hospital
Boston, "For those [of] us who actually see these children, there is no debate."100
92 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Op-Ed., Anatomy of a Misdiagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
21, 2010, at A31. Professor Findley recently appeared with Ms. Edmunds on a television
program hosted by news journalist Katie Couric to proclaim Ms. Edmunds's innocence and
promote the false AHT/SBS controversy. Katie: Falsely Accused: Innocent Behind Bars
(ABC television broadcast Dec. 10, 2012); see also Emily Bazelon, Shaken, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 6, 2011, at 30; Richard Ruelas, New Doubts in "Shaken Baby" Fatalities,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 2012, at Al; Maia Szalavitz, The Shaky Science of Shaken Baby
Syndrome, TIME (Jan. 17, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/01/17/the-shaky-science-
of-shaken-baby-syndrome. Indeed, several articles have appeared more recently in
response to the Smith dissent. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, A Vindictive Decision: The
Supreme Court Sends a Grandmother Back to Prison to Teach the 9th Circuit a Lesson,
SLATE (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/20
11/11/shakenbaby-syndrome andthesupreme court .html; A.C. Thompson & Joseph
Shapiro, New Evidence Complicates High Profile Shaken Baby Case, ALASKA DISPATCH
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/new-evidence-complicates-high-
profile-shaken-baby-case; Carol J. Williams, A Pawn in a Legal Chess Match, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/16/local/la-me-1216-shaken-baby-
verdict-20101216.
9 See sources cited supra note 23.
94 See sources cited supra note 24.
95 See Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution, supra note 23, at 550
(describing the "national crisis in forensic science" as including "the SBS context [because]
there is a tension between the criminal law's treatment of forensic science claims and what
scientists now know about the validity of these [SBS] claims").
96 Lyons, supra note 24, at 1109.
9 Imwinkelreid, supra note 23, at 158 ("The question here is whether shaken baby
syndrome evidence is 'junk' science presenting an intolerable risk of a wrongful
conviction . . .
98 Orenstein, supra note 24, at 1306.
99 Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 11.
100 Carey Goldberg, Pediatrics Academy President-Elect on "Shaken Baby
Syndrome, " WBUR'S COMMONHEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Oct. 4, 2010, 2:53 PM),
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According to Dr. Robert W. Block of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the so-
called AHT/SBS controversy was created
by a few people who ignore the known science and excuse the
confessional literature, the clinical experience that many of us have
working with babies who are injured or killed and the people who hurt
them, and choose instead to come up with alternative hypotheses, none
of which are substantiated by reasonable science.' 0'
Dr. Desmond Runyan, M.D., Professor of Social Medicine and Pediatrics at
the University of North Carolina School of Medicine, specifically criticized
Professor Tuerkheimer's effort to discredit the diagnosis of AHT/SBS as based on
"factual an[d] conceptual errors" including her misuse of his own research. 102
According to Dr. Runyan:
Where Professor Tuerkheimer states that there are more than 1000 babies
labeled with the diagnosis of shaken baby, she used an estimate derived
from a study that I helped design and conduct. In North Carolina we had
80 cases of children less than 2 years of age who were diagnosed as
having suffered an inflicted traumatic brain injury in 2000 and 2001.
This yielded a rate of 17/100,000 children in the first 2 years of life. In
that study we undertook a careful blinded secondary review of the case
circumstances and found that the diagnoses were accurate and well done
and the[re were] only two cases that we found mis-identified. In one case
we determined it was most likely an accident and in another we
concluded [t]he case was likely abusive[.] In both cases the physician
involved called it "undetermined." From the 80 North Carolina cases that
constituted our sample over two years, only 54 cases proceeded to the
courts. In 80% of those cases there was a guilty plea by the perpetrator.
Thus, there were six trials each year and five convictions.' 03
Thus, according to Dr. Runyan, Professor Tuerkheimer improperly based her claim
of 1,000 SBS diagnoses on his work. Dr. Runyan indicated that, when Professor
Tuerkheimer cited his research, she omitted any data that would have undermined
her argument. Professor Tuerkheimer failed to acknowledge the critical fact that in
the twelve North Carolina prosecutions that went to trial, "[t]he information the
juries used went far beyond Prof. Turkheimer's 'triad' and included careful








Thus, according to Dr. Runyan, his research does not support "[h]er premise that
there are many hundreds of people languishing in jails with false convictions."', 0
A more general criticism of Professor Tuerkheimer and everyone else who
has opined that there is a "criminal justice crisis" of false AHT/SBS convictions, is
that child physical abuse cases are significantly underreported and therefore
underprosecuted.106 The fact that law professors are, at least in part, promulgating
the false AHT/SBS controversy is deeply troubling to Judge Gill who believes that
Professor Tuerkheimer's
over-extension of the highly questionable medical minority view on the
subject into the legal world ... are not medically, scientifically or legally
correct. They suggest a legal tilting at her new "innocence
project." . . . But her project is guilty of existing pretty much in her own
mind. Her sources are scant and wrong.107
With no support from the pediatric subspecialist communities, legal
academics seeking to advance the AHT/SBS false controversy have been
(unsurprisingly) forced to rely on the same handful of defense-employed witnesses
who regularly testify for the defense in child abuse and child homicide cases for all
of their "scientific" support.os Since the Woodward trial, these medical witnesses
have published articles challenging the diagnosis of AHT/SBS and proposing a
range of alternative causal theories to explain traumatic and deadly brain injuries in
infants.109 These articles provide publications that can be cited from the witness
stand to support defense-sponsored testimony opining that an infant's traumatic
brain injury was not caused by abuse. However, judges and juries are apparently
unaware of the fact that, with few exceptions, these papers have encountered
overwhelming evidence-based critique from a broad range of medical
1o5 Id.
106 See Albert et al., supra note 33, at 40 ("The reported rates of child abuse resulting
in homicide have been documented to be underreported by as much as 50% to 60%.").
107 Gill, supra note 73.
108 Dr. Robert W. Block explained that it is critical to recognize that "the real experts
are the physicians who work every day with these cases and have both authored and read
voluminous literature that substantiates the existence of abusive head trauma, and those are
the folks who are the most capable of informing the public about what the issue really is"
so as to distinguish them from the law professors or students or both who "creat[e] these
sham media blasts that [cause] great confusion." See Goldberg, supra note 100.
109 See, e.g., Bandak, supra note 16; Donohoe, supra note 56; Jan E. Leestma, Case
Analysis of Brain-Injured Admittedly Shaken Infants: 54 Cases, 1969-2001, 26 AM. J.
FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 199 (2005); Rubin Miller & Marvin Miller,
Overrepresentation of Males in Traumatic Brain Injury of Infancy and in Infants with
Macrocephaly, 31 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 165 (2010); Waney Squier,
Shaken Baby Syndrome: The Quest for Evidence, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD
NEUROLOGY 10 (2008); Ronald Uscinski, Shaken Baby Syndrome: An Odyssey, 46
NEUROLOGIA MEDICO-CHIRURGICA 57 (2006).
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professionals. They are also generally viewed as being written for the purpose of
maintaining or increasing the authors' lucrative defense witness appearances."o
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the outlier views expressed by defense
medical witnesses and parroted in law review articles is self-validating."' The
1no Many articles that are written and then cited by defense experts fall far short of the
type of peer-reviewed scientific literature standards contemplated by the Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). As discussed above,
frequdnt defense witness Dr. Patrick Barnes has, at least once, misleadingly suggested that
an article was published in a peer-reviewed journal, while failing to explain that the article,
because it was a commentary piece, had not been subject to peer review. See Keller &
Barnes, supra note 48 and accompanying text. Dr. Barnes also published articles (single
case reports) based on cases where he served as a defense witness. See Patrick D. Barnes et
al., Infant Acute Life- Threatening Event-Dysphagic Choking Versus Nonaccidental
Injury, 17 SEMINARS PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 7 (2010) [hereinafter Barnes et al.,
Dysphagic Choking]; Patrick D. Barnes et al., Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury: Accidental
Versus Nonaccidental Injury, 15 SEMINARS PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 178 (2008). Both
articles were published in a topical journal that has publishing guidelines that do not
include any form of peer-review process before publication. See NEUROLOGY ADVANCE,
http://www.neurologyadvance.com/content/neurologyadvance-joumalspage-paedia (last
visited June 13, 2013). Dr. Christopher S. Greeley has addressed the problems with
Barnes's Dysphagic Choking at some length, noting that Dr. Barnes and his coauthors (1)
omitted evidence of additional salient abuse injuries to the child; (2) omitted the fact that
the case resulted in a child abuse trial, see Thomas v. State, No. 03-07-00646-CR, 2009
WL 1364348 (Tex. Ct. App. May 14, 2009); (3) omitted the fact that the defendant was
convicted of child abuse; (4) omitted the fact that the defendant's conviction was affirmed
on appeal; and (5) failed to reveal their own roles as defense witnesses at trial. See Dr.
Christopher S. Greeley, Letter to the Editor, 17 SEMINARS PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY 275
(2010). There is also evidence that some authors, whose work has been published in
nonpeer-reviewed journals or has been subjected to critical review, try to deter readers
from discovering this type of discrediting evidence. For example, in a more recent paper,
Dr. Barnes again postulated "dysphagic choking" as a mimic of AHT/SBS. Patrick D.
Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury and the Mimics: Issues and Controversies in the
Era of Evidence-Based Medicine, 49 RADIOLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 205 (2011) [hereinafter
Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury]. However, rather than citing to his published
paper on this topic (which would inevitably reveal Dr. Greeley's discrediting critique), he
cited instead to a similarly titled conference presentation and failed to address (or even
mention) Dr. Greeley's critique. Id. at 220 n.167.
111 A review of the medical sources cited in the recent spate of law review articles
cited supra notes 23-24 reveals a common practice of citing to the same handful of defense
witnesses for "scientific" support. Notably absent is any recognition of the abundant
medical literature supporting the clinical and empirical validity of the AHT/SBS diagnosis.
This form of selective citation is, as Professor Ceccarelli notes, a hallmark of manufactured
scientific controversy. See Ceccarelli, supra note 1, at 196 and accompanying text. While
Professor Tuerkheimer was writing her first article, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken
Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, supra note 23, she contacted one of this Article's
authors, Brian Holmgren, for information and she was provided with over two-hundred
pages of materials documenting the medical literature supporting the diagnosis of
AHT/SBS and critiquing many of the sources she relied upon in her work. This material is
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academics cite the same handful of defense medical witnesses, the media cites
both, the defense medical witnesses benefit from the publicity and are hired in
more cases, and the cycle begins anew.
The most recent law review articles eliminate the circularity in favor of direct
collaboration.112 With everyone on the same page, law professors and defense
experts work together to promote doubt and uncertainty that (1) AHT/SBS is an
anecdotal medical diagnosis without scientific proof;1 3 (2) there is no "evidence-
based" medical research to support the AHT/SBS diagnosis;'l 4 (3) adults cannot
conspicuously absent from all of Professor Tuerkheimer's academic work on AHT/SBS to
date.
112 See Symposium, supra note 23 (transcribing remarks made during a joint
presentation with frequent defense medical witness Patrick Bames who Professor Findley
had employed to testify on behalf of Audrey Edmunds); Findley et al., supra note 23.
" Findley et al., supra note 23, at 299-300 ("[T]he real problem is that the literature
cited in support of the SBS/AHT hypothesis falls at the bottom of the hierarchy of evidence
and rests almost entirely on assumptions and hypotheses, combined with emotionally
compelling demonstrations and anecdotal evidence, largely in the form of confessions.");
Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury, supra note 110 (characterizing "much of the
traditional literature on child abuse . . . [as] anecdotal case series, case reports, reviews,
opinions, and position papers"); J.F. Geddes & J. Plunkett, The Evidence Base for Shaken
Baby Syndrome, 328 BMJ 719, 719-20 (2004) (suggesting that the medical literature and
diagnostic criteria supporting the AHT/SBS diagnosis are inadequate and flawed and
expressing doubt about the existence of AHT/SBS); Jan E. Leestma, Child Abuse:
Neuropathology Perspectives, in FORENSIC NEUROPATHOLOGY 561, 602 (Jan E. Leestma
ed., 2d ed. 2008) (characterizing the medical literature linking shaking to pathology-injury
findings as deficient and anecdotal).
14 See, e.g., Findley et al., supra note 23, at 237-38 (claiming that Dr. Mark
Donohoe-the author of Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, supra note
56-"examined the research support for SBS through 1998 and concluded what others-
including the NIH conference participants-had been saying privately for years: the
research basis for shaken baby syndrome was remarkably weak" and citing Dr. Donohoe's
conclusion that "the commonly held opinion that the finding of [subdural hemorrhage] and
[retinal hemorrhage] in an infant was strong evidence [of] SBS was unsustainable, at least
from the medical literature").
Defense medical witnesses and legal academics routinely rely on Dr. Donohoe's
single three-page article to support their assertions that AHT/SBS does not exist. For
examples from the medical witness articles, see Barnes et al., Dysphagic Choking, supra
note 110, at 1; Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury, supra note I10, at 206; Geddes &
Plunkett, supra note 113, at 719-20; Leestma, supra note 51, at 14; Leestma, supra note
109; Jan Leestma, The So-Called "Shaken Baby Syndrome": A Concept Unsupported by
Science and the Facts, IND. DEFENDER, March 2006, at 1; James LeFanu, Wrongful
Diagnosis of Child Abuse-A Master Theory, 98 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 249 (2005); Marvin
Miller et al., A Sojourn in the Abyss: Hypothesis, Theory, and Established Truth in Infant
Head Injury, 114 PEDIATRICS 326 (2004) (including as coauthors Patrick Barnes, Jan
Leestma, John Plunkett, Ron Uscinski, and several others); Miller & Miller, supra note
109, at 169; Squier, supra note 109, at I1; Uscinski, supra note 109. For examples from the
legal literature, see Burg, supra note 24, at 665 nn.53-56 and accompanying text; Gena,
supra note 24, at 706 n.56, 710 n.95-100, 711 n.101, 727 n.270 and accompanying text;
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shake infants hard enough to cause injuries ascribed to AHT/SBS based on
biomechanical research;"'5 (4) violent shaking would break the infant's neck or
result in other thoracic injuries; 16 (5) suspects' confessions are false, cannot
explain the injuries, and result from coercive prosecution-biased interrogation;' 17
(6) AHT/SBS is routinely diagnosed solely on triad findings (i.e., retinal
hemorrhages, subdural or subarachnoid hemorrhages, and brain
encephalopathy); "8 (7) the diagnostic triad is nonspecific; "9 (8) alternative
Ramsey, supra note 24, at 26 n. 143; Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note
23, at 12 n.70-74, 13 n.75-79 and accompanying text; Walker, supra note 24, at 28 n.188-
90, 37 n.239-43, 38 n.244-45, 39 n.252-57 and accompanying text.
115 For examples from the medical witness articles, see Leestma, supra note 113, at
577, 600-04 (questioning the findings of several articles related to shaking without impact
causing SBS); Waney Squier, The "Shaken Baby" Syndrome: Pathology and Mechanisms,
122 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519, 520 (2011) (same); Uscinski, supra note 109 (calling
SBS a hypothetical supposition). For examples from the legal literature see Symposium,
supra note 23, at 226 (statement of Professor Keith Findley) ("We . . . learned a lot from
biomechanical engineers who had been studying the thresholds for brain injuries of the
type we see here. What they found was that human adults simply cannot shake an infant
hard enough to inflict the kinds of head injuries that we see in these cases . . . ."); Findley et
al., supra note 23, at 215 ("[B]iomechanical studies have consistently concluded that
shaking does not generate enough force to produce the types of traumatic damage
associated with SBS/AHT . . . .").
116 For examples from the medical witness articles see Barnes, Imaging of
Nonaccidental Injury, supra note 110, at 212 (suggesting that shaking would cause injuries
to the neck and upper spinal cord); Leestma, supra note 113, at 577 (same); Uscinski,
supra note 109, at 59 (same). For examples from the legal articles, see Burg, supra note 24,
at 666 ("[T]he brain injuries associated with the triad cannot occur by shaking without the
child also suffering injury to the neck, cervical spinal column, or cervical spinal cord.");
Findley, et al., supra note 23, at 237 ("[S]haking does not produce the force required to
rupture bridging veins and axons and would cause extensive cervical spine injury or failure
(i.e., neck injury) before causing such effects."); Gena, supra note 24, at 711-12;
Orenstein, supra note 24, at 1312 ("[S]haking alone produces insufficient force to cause the
observed injuries [and] shaking that does produce such force would cause spinal or neck
injuries that are typically absent in SBS cases."); Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence
Project, supra note 23, at 19-20.
117 See Symposium, supra note 23, at 232-33 (statement of Professor Keith Findley)
(asserting that neither confession nor convictions can confirm an AHT/SBS diagnosis);
Findley et al., supra note 23, at 256-61 (characterizing child abuse confession research as
statistically unreliable and unable to corroborate shaking as a mechanism for injury);
Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 13-14 (suggesting that there
are problems with using confessions to support the validity of AHT/SBS).
1 For an example from the medical witness articles, see, for example, Barnes,
Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury, supra note 110, at 209 (asserting that prosecutions of
AHT/SBS are premised on the triad). For examples from the legal articles, see Symposium,
supra note 23, at 223 (statement of Professor Keith Findley) (criticizing child abuse and
child homicide prosecutions that involve an AHT/SBS diagnosis as the "one area in the law
where the science is used to prove all elements of the crime" because "[i]n many cases it
comes down to science and nothing more than that"); Findley et al., supra note 23, at 219
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medical conditions and accidental traumas account for injuries misdiagnosed as
AHT/SBS; 120 and (9) injuries cannot be timed to identify a perpetrator because
children can have "lucid intervals" after severe injuries. 121 The popular press is
(asserting that AHT/SBS is a "hypothesis that violent shaking may be reliably diagnosed
based on the triad of subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and encephalopathy (brain
damage) if the caretakers do not describe a major trauma . . . and no alternative medical
explanation is identified"); Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project, supra note 23, at 11
(asserting that "the triad of symptoms was believed to be distinctly characteristic-in
scientific terms, pathognomonic-of violent shaking").
1 For an example from the medical witness articles, see Squier, supra note 115, at
520 (characterizing the triad as not diagnostic of AHT/SBS). For examples from the legal
articles, see Burg, supra note 24, at 663-64; Symposium, supra note 23, at 224-25
(statement of Professor Keith Findley) (criticizing the validity of the AHT/SBS diagnosis
as "based on the belief that the triad elements were . . . traumatic in origin" and that
"[b]ecause the brain damage was often bilateral and widespread, it was assumed the force
needed . .. was comparable to . .. that found in . . . motor vehicle accidents" and therefore
"if the history provided by the caretakers did not include a major accident, the history was
considered to be inconsistent with the findings, and abuse was considered to be the only
plausible explanation"); Michele Nethercott, The Role of Forensic Science and Scientific
Evidence in the Defense of Criminal Cases, in UTILIZING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 7, 15 (2012) ("[T]he original notion of [AHT/]SBS proponents that an infant who
exhibited the triad of symptoms, including a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and
a swollen brain, could exhibit this constellation of symptoms only as a result of a violent
shaking, which had occurred shortly before the onset of the symptoms, has now been
shown to be incorrect."); Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution, supra note 23, at
516-17 (asserting that convictions in cases involving AHT/SBS diagnoses are necessarily
suspect because "research has shown that retinal hemorrhages and subdural hematomas can
result from forces other than shaking," thus, "the myth of pathonomony-which told that
the diagnostic triad was necessarily and exclusively induced by shaking-has been
debunked").
120 For examples from the medical witness articles, see Barnes, Imaging of
Nonaccidental Injury, supra note 110, at 205-06. For an example from the legal articles
see Symposium, supra note 23, at 239-40 (statement of Dr. Patrick Barnes) ("[W]e have
found with advanced technology . . . that there are a number of conditions that have
nothing to do with trauma-for example medical illnesses including infections, bleeding or
clotting problems-that can have findings that mimic abuse. And in some very young
infants (e.g., under six months of age) who were thought to have been shaken or battered,
their symptoms and signs actually extended from birth injuries or conditions. And this not
only includes brain injury and bleeding, but also bone injuries or fractures, especially with
the more recent revelations that nutritional deficiencies have come back, like vitamin D and
vitamin C deficiencies, which can cause Rickets and Scurvy."); Squier, supra note 115, at
519 (listing numerous alternative theories of causation).
121 For examples from the medical witness articles, see Leestma, supra note 113, at
577-78, 604-05 (asserting that lucid intervals with subdural hematomas and head injury is
a well-known phenomenon); Leestma, supra note 51 (asserting that the case literature does
not support the conclusion that symptoms are typically immediate). For examples from the
legal articles see Symposium, supra note 23, at 229-30 (statement of Professor Keith
Findley) (claiming that "we have the evidence that lucid intervals are a distinct reality" and
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complicit when it presents sympathetic or sensationalistic claims, but ignores the
extensive empirical evidence that doctors rely on legitimate diagnostic criteria for
AHT/SBS. Legitimate medical responses that utilize scientific "controversy"
terminology may inadvertently add to the confusion. 122
The Smith dissent makes it more likely that these increasingly common but
unreliable medical opinions will be admitted in future child homicide and abuse
cases. No appellate court has ruled that AHT/SBS fails to satisfy standards of
evidentiary reliability for admission. But the effect of defense challenges at trial
are more difficult to measure, because acquittals are the only outcome likely to be
reported on, if at all, in-the media. There has been no systematic research designed
to assess the impact of defense testimony attacking AHT/SBS on the adjudication
of child homicide or child abuse cases. But abundant anecdotal evidence suggests
that when such evidence is presented by defense-retained medical witnesses, jurors
and judges in child abuse and child homicide cases are more inclined to acquit
defendants or to convict them of less serious offenses.
These concerns are more profound during postconviction proceedings. The
legal standards for raising postconviction challenges (i.e., factual innocence, newly
discovered evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims) provide
effective mechanisms for advancing specious but scientific-sounding claims. The
standards for scientific evidence in postconviction proceedings are murky. Every
newly published medical article or law review article (regardless of content or
quality) that challenges the "orthodoxy," proposes an alternative causation theory,
or purports to have uncovered a "paradigm shift" provides the opportunity to argue
that the defendant is factually innocent, that there is newly discovered evidence, or
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the AHT/SBS diagnosis.
Whenever an appellate court relies on unsubstantiated scientific claims, or a
misunderstanding of precedent, to find that the AHT/SBS "controversy" requires a
new trial, this decision gamers significant media attention. The media reports
focus, not on the science, but on "groundbreaking" revelations of blameless
parents and caretakers languishing in jail and their brave fight against the
intransigent pro-prosecution medical mainstream.
Ironically, the Smith dissent cannot be attributed to the normal shortcomings
of the AHT/SBS postconviction challenge. Smith's habeas petition did not include
legal affidavits from defense medical witnesses attacking the medical testimony at
trial. In fact, the petitioil contained just one citation to the routinely cited defense
that "research shows lucid intervals of up to seventy-two hours or more" but citing only to
testimony from Dr. Robert Huntington, from the Edmunds case, that "[t]he lucid interval is
a distinct discomforting but real possibility"); Findley et al., supra note 23, at 250-51
(claiming that "there is no real dispute over whether lucid intervals can occur").
122 See, e.g., Kent P. Hymel et al., Intracranial Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in
Suspected Victims of Abusive Head Trauma: Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7
CHILD MALTREATMENT 329, 329-48 (2002) (addressing multiple aspects of forensic
controversy); Tim Jaspan, Current Controversies in the Interpretation of Non-Accidental
Head Injury, 38 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY S378 (Supp. 2008) (discussing current
controversies).
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literature and did not include any postconviction medical testimony from defense
witnesses proposing that "newly discovered evidence" established Smith's actual
innocence. The legal briefs also did not include any of the evidence or arguments
that had been omitted from the habeas petition. Thus, Smith is especially troubling
because the dissenters themselves went looking outside the record for evidence to
support their conclusion that "[d]oubt has increased in the medical community
'over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone."'" 23
III. CA VAZOS V. SmiTH: 1996-2012
A. Fifteen Years of Litigation, Three Decisions from the Ninth Circuit Granting
Habeas Relief and Three Reversals from the United States Supreme Court
Shirley Ree Smith was arrested in 1996 and charged with assault on a child
resulting in death.124 She was tried the following year, convicted, and sentenced to
fifteen years to life.125 Following exhaustion of her state appellate challenges,12 6
the defendant brought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.' 27
In her federal habeas petition, Smith claimed that her due process rights had
been violated because the evidence introduced at trial was "constitutionally
insufficient" particularly with respect to "one element of the crime-the cause of
the child's death." 128 On February 6, 2006, the Ninth Circuit reversed her
conviction based on its finding that no rational jury could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Smith caused the child's death, and the defendant was
released from prison.' 29 This ruling was reversed and remanded by the United
States Supreme Court on April 30, 2007,130 for further consideration in light of
123 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 10 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam)
(quoting State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)).
124 Id. at 4 (majority opinion); see also supra text accompanying note 7 (explaining
that the defendant was convicted under CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West 2008) and
quoting the relevant statutory language).
125 Id. at 5 ("The jury found Smith guilty. Concluding that the jury carefully weighed
the tremendous amount of evidence supporting the verdict, the trial judge denied Smith's
motion for a new trial and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in
prison." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126 Id. at 5-6 ("On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After thoroughly reviewing the competing medical
testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim .... The California Supreme
Court [also] denied review." (citation omitted)).
127 Id. at 6 ("Smith then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, renewing her claim that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that Etzel died of SBS.").
128 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007) (mem.).
129 Id. at 890. Thus, Smith served only a portion of her imposed sentence.
130 Patrick, 550 U.S. at 915.
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Carey v. Musladin,'31 in which the Court emphasized the deference owed to state
court juries in federal petitions for postconviction review.132
On December 4, 2007, the Ninth Circuit reinstated its 2006 decision based on
a finding that "the opinion of the prosecution experts that shaking of the infant had
caused death was wholly unsupported by the physical evidence." 33 On January 19,
2010, the Supreme Court again reversed and remanded to the Ninth Circuit for
further consideration in light of McDaniel v. Brown,'34 a new case clarifying the
standard for habeas review. 35
On October 29, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reinstated its 2006 decision based on
its finding, once again, that "nothing in the physical evidence supported the
prosecution experts' testimony as to the cause of death."' 36 The Supreme Court
reversed this decision for the third time on October 31, 201 1,17 and on February 3,
2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Smith's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.'3 8
On April 6, 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown commuted Smith's
sentence stating, "it is clear that significant doubts surround Ms. Smith's
conviction."' 39
B. Smith Illustrates Problems Endemic to Postconviction Review of
Fact-Intensive Cases
An unfortunate reality of the appellate process is that pertinent facts from the
trial record are often lost, ignored, distorted, taken out of context, or omitted as the
case is presented in later hearings. In some cases, decreased judicial reliance on the
facts may be appropriate, especially where the facts have little bearing on the legal
analysis. However, child abuse cases are inherently fact based and Cavazos v.
Smith provides a classic example of the problems that arise as multiple layers of
appeals move the courts further from the relevant facts the jury considered.
At every level of appeal, the critical issue in Smith was the defendant's claim
that there was insufficient evidence of her guilt.140 This claim pertains to both the
sufficiency of the medical evidence regarding the victim's cause of death and the
nonmedical evidence implicating the defendant's acts as the cause of the victim's
' 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
132 Id. at 77.
133 Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 558 U.S. 1143
(2010).
134 558 U.S. 120 (2010).
13 Patrick v. Smith, 558 U.S. 1134 (2010) (mem.).
136 Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Cavazos v.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (per curiam).
13 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 2.
138 Smith v. Cavazos, 667 F.3d 1308, 1308 (9th Cir. 2012) (mem.). At this point
Smith had been out of prison for nearly six years.
139 See supra note 22.
140 See supra Part III.A.
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fatal injuries.141 The most thorough and complete recitation of the medical and
nonmedical evidence appears in the February 10, 2000, decision from the
California Court of Appeal.14 2 Thus, this discussion of the facts is principally
derived from that decision. However, possible sources of confusion and additional
or conflicting facts contained in subsequent decisions from the Ninth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court have also been identified and explained.14 3 What
follows is a review of the nonmedical and medical evidence presented at trial.
Where appropriate, the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense and
relied upon by the reviewing courts will be compared to the relevant evidence base
in the widely available research literature.
141 See Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom.
Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007). The California Court of Appeals had already
rejected the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during her direct
appeal. Id. at 888.
142 See People v. Smith, No. B 18869 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000). In addition to
this unpublished decision, the authors of this Article have also reviewed the trial transcripts
of each of the five medical experts who testified. This review revealed that, although the
testimony of the prosecution experts encompassed nearly six-hundred pages of transcript,
the appellate courts focused on the defense witnesses and summarized the prosecution
witnesses' testimony in just a few paragraphs. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, People v.
Smith, No. B118869 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000).
143 Repeated appeals also provide courts the opportunity to correct factual errors
created when lower courts ignore or omit relevant facts. The Ninth Circuit had two
opportunities to present an accurate assessment of the evidence presented at trial.
Unfortunately, on both occasions, the court opted instead to microfocus on the narrow set
of facts they claimed supported the conclusion that "no rational jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt, in light of all the evidence, that Smith had shaken the baby to death."
Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Cavazos v. Smith,
132 S. Ct. 2 (2011). The Ninth Circuit also made the implausible claim that, to reach this
conclusion, it had "not resolve[d] any disputes of historical fact against the prosecution[,]
[but] ... simply assessed the prosecution's evidence on its own terms and concluded that it
did not meet the Jackson standard . . . ." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) ("[Tlhe relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.")). As such, the prosecution's evidence
"was so lacking that the state court's rejection of Smith's argument over the insufficiency
of the evidence was an unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of this case." Id. As
the Supreme Court correctly observed, in fact the Ninth Circuit simply ignored "the
plenitude of expert testimony in the trial record concluding that sudden shearing or tearing
of the brainstem was the cause of Etzel's death." Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 6. Thus, "[tihe Ninth
Circuit's assertion that [the prosecution's] experts reached [their] conclusion because there
is no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of death is simply false." Id. at 7 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original).
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C The Nonmedical Evidence Presented to the Smith Jury
1. Etzel's Living Arrangements and Caregivers
Etzel Glass was born on October 10, 1996,144 and died on November 29,
1996.145 Etzel had been born two weeks before his due date with jaundice and a
heart murmur, both of which had fully resolved before his death.146 No additional
complications surrounding his birth were reported.14 7
At the time of his death, Etzel lived with his grandmother, the defendant,
Shirley Ree Smith. 148 Etzel's mother, Tomeka, his sister, Yolanda (four years old),
and his brother Yondale (fourteen months old) along with several other family
members also lived with Smith. 149 Smith helped Tomeka care for her children and
she was generally described as a loving grandmother who was not harsh or abusive
to her grandchildren.' 50
2. Etzel Appeared Normal During the Day and Evening Before He Died
On November 29, 1996, Smith took Etzel and his siblings to visit her sister
Renee Townsend. 15 Etzel seemed normal during the day. 152 He was eating,
smiling, moving his arms and legs, and having normal urination and bowel
movements.15 3 That night, at approximately 11:30 p.m., after Etzel had been fed,
changed, and bathed by his mother, Tomeka put him to sleep on his stomach on a
sofa in the living room of Renee's apartment. 15 4 Renee left for work when Etzel
was put down to sleep.'" Etzel's brother, Yondale, slept on the same sofa with
'" Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 884, 885. The California appellate decision erroneously listed
Etzel's date of birth as November 10, 2006. See People v. Smith, No. B 1l8869, slip op. at
2.
145 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 4.
146 People v. Smith, No. BI 18869, slip op. at 2.
I47 See id.
148 Id.
149 Id.; Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 886.
0 Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 885. The opinion does not indicate who provided this
testimony at the trial. However, Etzel's mother (Tomeka Smith) or Smith's sister (Renee
Townsend) must have provided it. As discussed below, see infra Part III.C.4-5, although
omitted from the decisions by the state and federal appellate courts, this trial testimony is
inconsistent with statements made by both witnesses to the social services and police
investigators.
151 People v. Smith, No. Bl 18869, slip op. at 2.
152 Id. at 2-3.
153 Id. at 3. Etzel's ability to feed appropriately indicated he had not yet sustained any
fatal injuries. The Ninth Circuit also described Tomeka's testimony as indicating that Etzel
appeared perfectly healthy during the day and at the beginning of the evening when both
she and Smith fed him. Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 885-86.
154 People v. Smith, No. Bl 18869, slip op. at 3.
5 Id.
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Etzel while his sister, Yolanda, slept on a love seat in the same room.'16 Smith
slept on the floor next to the sofa.'5 Renee's children slept in the room they
shared.'5 8 Etzel was fine at 11:30 p.m. when Tomeka put him to sleep. 5 9 Tomeka
remained in the living room for about an hour.160 During this time, she checked his
diaper and noticed him moving.' 6' Although Tomeka normally slept in the living
room, that night she went into Renee's bedroom to listen to music and fell
asleep.16 2 Thus, after midnight Smith was Etzel's only caregiver.163
3. Etzel's Condition While in the Defendant's Care
At approximately 1:30 a.m., Smith awoke and stated she found Etzel on the
floor.' 64 "She picked him up, rocked him back to sleep, and placed him on the
couch in the same position (stomach down, head to the side)."165 There was no
indication that Smith noticed anything unusual about Etzel at that time.166
The suggestion that Etzel's injuries could have been caused by a fall from the
couch to the floor is clearly contradicted by the medical evidence, general well-
accepted information about pediatric development, and common sense. As
discussed below, none of the five medical experts who testified during the trial
suggested that Etzel's injuries and death could have been attributable to a short fall
of less than two feet. The medical literature likewise - does not support this
conclusion.' 67 Moreover, because a seven-week-old child can barely scoot and
cannot roll over, it is developmentally highly unlikely that Etzel accidentally fell
off a couch. Given these facts, it is reasonable to conclude that Smith provided a
false story of a fall to explain Etzel's injuries. The child abuse literature is replete
with this type of "accidental fall" from household items as a history offered to
explain a range of severe injuries. In fact, these caretaker explanations are so
common they are referred to in the professional literature as "the killer couch"






160 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.






166 Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, Smith related this information to Tomeka. Id.
167 See, e.g., David L. Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death Resulting from Short
Falls Among Young Children: Less than I in I Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213, 1213, 1220
(2008) (summarizing decades of research on short falls and noting the extreme rarity of
such events).
168 See Brian K. Holmgren, Prosecuting the Shaken Infant Case, in THE SHAKEN
BABY SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 9, at 275, 287 (noting
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feet, when offered to account for severe head trauma, is one of several false
histories that permit a diagnosis of AHT to be made with statistical reliability.169
Smith said that she awoke again at 3:20 a.m. because she had to go to the
bathroom. 70 After she returned from the bathroom, she noticed that Etzel had
thrown up and had blood on his right nostril.'7' When Etzel did not respond to her
touch, Smith "rushed into the bedroom holding Etzel and wakened Tomeka."l 72
"Etzel was limp and appeared to have vomit coming from his nose." 73 Smith said,
"Tomeka, Tomeka. Something is wrong with Etzel.... [C]all 911."14 Smith then
passed the baby to Tomeka, who then called 911.171
4. Defendant's Various Statements to Investigators Regarding Etzel's Death
Firefighters and paramedics responded to the apartment at 3:36 a.m.176 When
emergency personnel arrived, Smith was "apprehensive" and stated that she
thought Etzel had fallen off the couch.'77 Etzel was clothed, laying on the bed, and
had bright red blood in one nostril. 7 8 He was warm, but he was not breathing and
had no heartbeat.1' The firefighters administered CPR without success. 1s Etzel
"the killer couch" among several categories of false histories about how the child became
injured in SBS cases); Robert Reece, Medical Evidence in the Context of Child Abuse
Litigation, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 607, 610 (2002) (noting instances of children falling off a
couch as "discrepant histories"); Nancy Lewis, Cases Face Medical and Legal Blocks,
WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at Al ("The killer couch excuse endures because there is too
little training in the distinctive nature of childhood injury and too little suspicion about
motives, experts say.").
169 See Joeli Hettler & David S. Greenes, Can the Initial History Predict Whether a
Child with a Head Injury Has Been Abused?, 111 PEDIATRICS 602, 604-07 (2003); see also
C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 18 (1962) ("A
marked discrepancy between clinical findings and historical data as supplied by the parents
is a major diagnostic feature of the Battered Child Syndrome."). Ironically, the Supreme
Court has itself dealt with the "killer couch" scenario in one of the few other AHT cases it
has decided. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-75 (1991) (approving admission of
evidence of earlier injuries to refute this claim). Notably, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the
Supreme Court's opinions in Smith reference this relevant precedent.
"o Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 886, vacated sub nom. Patrick, 550 U.S. at 915.
'' Id.







1 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).




was transported to the hospital and arrived at 3:50 a.m.' 8 ' At that point, he was in
full cardiac arrest, and was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.1 82
Doctors initially suspected that Etzel had died as a result of Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome (SIDS).1 83 After the autopsy was concluded, however, the cause
of death was found to be SBS.18 4
On December 5, 1996, a social worker, Linda Reusser, went to Renee's
apartment and told Tomeka and Smith that the cause of death had been changed to
SBS.' Ms. Reusser asked Smith what happened the night of Etzel's death.186
Smith told her that Yondale had awakened at about 3:20 a.m. and that she had
gone to comfort him.'87 Smith said she also went over to Etzel and saw that he was
face down.'88 Smith said she became worried when she touched Etzel and he did
not respond so she picked him up and gave him "a little shake, a jostle" to waken
him.' 89 Smith said that Etzel's head was flopped back when she picked him up.' 90
Smith then demonstrated how she had picked Etzel up by his armpits with her
hands even with her shoulders and gave what was described as "a quick jostle"
making a smooth rather than a jerky motion. 9' At that point, Smith stopped
talking.192 The social worker then asked Smith, "What happened next?" and Smith
replied "Oh my God. Did I do it? Did I do it? Oh, my God."' 93 Ms. Reusser also
testified that Tomeka told Smith, "If it wasn't for you, this wouldn't have
happened." 94 Finally, the social worker told Tomeka she was going to remove
Yondale and Yolanda while the investigation continued.'95
Los Angeles police officers interviewed Smith four days later on December 9,
1996.196 Smith stated that Etzel had been fine at 11:30 p.m. on the night of
November 29. 1 She said that she was awakened when Yolanda fell on her.' 98
1' Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 886.
182 Id.
183 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 3.
184 Id. at 3-4. The medical basis for this diagnosis is discussed infra in Part III.D.






'9' Id. The Ninth Circuit described this testimony slightly differently stating, "Smith
demonstrated picking up the baby under his arms and moving him quickly forward and
back in a smooth motion." Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 886 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated sub nom. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
192 People v. Smith, No. B 1l8869, slip op. at 4. Apparently Ms. Reusser testified to
Smith's demonstration, but it was not videotaped. See id.
9 Id.; see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam) (noting
defendant's statements to the social worker).
194 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at II n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Smith then noticed that Etzel needed to be changed and when she picked him up,
his head flopped back and he had vomit around his mouth.199 At first, Smith told
the police that she had shaken Etzel, 200 but she corrected herself claiming instead
that she had "twisted" him to try to elicit a response from him. 201 Smith said that
she shook Etzel for "just a matter of a few seconds."202 Smith also told the police
that Etzel had "fallen off the couch"203 earlier in the evening, was fine, and was
laid back down to sleep on the sofa.204
As discussed below, the medical evidence directly contradicts the defendant's
statements regarding the sequence of events. It supports the inference that events
happened in the reverse order-that Etzel became unresponsive after he had been
shaken.205
5. The Trial Testimony
At trial, Tomeka denied that she had blamed Smith during the interview with
Ms. Reusser. 206 Tomeka also testified that the social worker fabricated both
Smith's admissions that she had shaken or jostled Etzel and Smith's demonstration
of how she shook Etzel to wake him. 207 According to Tomeka, Ms. Reusser had
accused Smith of killing Etzel and Smith had responded by saying, "No I
didn't." 208 Finally, Tomeka testified that she could not remember any of the
statements she made to the police.209 Renee Townsend testified that Smith did not
have a temper and that she only corrected the children verbally. 2 10 "Smith herself




201 Id.; see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam) (noting
defendant's two contradictory statements to the police).202 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 4.203 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007). Smith's changing accounts of the events that evening were
likely understood by the jury as additional nonmedical evidence tending to establish her
guilt.
204 id.
205 See infra Parts II.D.1, III.D.2, III.D.3 and accompanying text.206 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 11 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
208 Id. at II (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209 Id. The jury likely understood the changing accounts of the facts from the
defendant's family members as additional nonmedical evidence tending to establish her
guilt. 210 People v. Smith, No. Bl 18869, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000).
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death." 2 1' The prosecutor did not subject the defendant to substantive cross-
212examination.
6. Summary of the Nonmedical Evidence
Medical evidence is a dominant aspect of most child abuse and child
homicide cases. However, nonmedical evidence is an important component of
these cases and may frequently be dispositive in the minds of jurors, especially in
cases that involve conflicting expert witness testimony.
In Smith, the nonmedical evidence established that Etzel was neurologically
normal in the hours leading up to the time when he was left in Smith's exclusive
care, indicating that he had not sustained any severe head trauma up to that
point. 213 This uncontradicted evidence provided a clear timeline of events
establishing that Etzel's neurological symptoms and death occurred only after he
was in Smith's care.2 14 The jury also viewed this evidence in conjunction with
Smith's own changing, conflicting, and implausible stories offered to account for
Etzel's fatal injuries. These include, most notably, Smith's admission to the fatal
mechanism of injury-shaking seven-week-old Etzel-although she
unsurprisingly attempted to minimize the force associated with her shaking her
grandson. Given that the jury also heard extensive medical evidence, discussed in
the next section, establishing that Etzel died from AHT caused by violent shaking
shortly after these injuries were inflicted, it should be clear that a rational trier of
fact could have found the prosecutor proved the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
D. The Medical Evidence Presented to the Smith Jury
At trial, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy, Dr. Stephanie
Erlich, her supervisor Dr. Eugene Carpenter, and Dr. David Chadwick, 215a
pediatric specialist in child abuse, all testified that the cause of death was SBS that
tore or sheared portions of Etzel's brain stem, resulting in death. 216 These
conclusions were supported by the autopsy and neuropathology findings discussed
at trial and by the extensive medical literature referenced at trial and cited below.
211 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 885 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Smith herself testified
very briefly . . . and her entire trial testimony extends for fewer than three pages of
transcript."), vacated sub nom. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
212 Id. (noting that Smith "was subjected to almost no cross-examination").
213 Id. at 886.
2 14 id.
215 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 5 (2011) (per curiam); People v. Smith, No.
B 118869.
216 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 4-5.
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1. Testimony from the Medical Examiner Who Conducted Etzel's Autopsy-Dr.
Erlich
(a) Dr. Erlich's Qualifications and Findings
Dr. Erlich, who was board certified in anatomic pathology and
neuropathology 217 and was completing a one-year residency in forensic
pathology,218 conducted both the autopsy and neuropathology exam. Her autopsy
examination revealed that Etzel had subdural hemorrhages and subarachnoid
hemorrhages. 219 This bleeding was located diffusely: (1) between the two halves of
his brain, (2) in the posterior fossa (i.e., at the base of his skull), and (3) on the
under surface of his brain. 220 Diffuse bleeding within the brain (i.e., bleeding
located in multiple areas of the brain) is a hallmark of rotational injury to the head
and is consistent with shaking, whereas focal hemorrhage (i.e., bleeding located in
a single location) is characteristic of a focal impact trauma (i.e., injury resulting
from a blow to the head or the head impacting against an object including injury
potentially associated with a significant fall). 22 1
The autopsy also revealed older blood, which.indicated an earlier brain injury
that could have occurred days or weeks prior to his death.222 Acute hemorrhages
were also found in both optic nerve sheaths, as well as older blood in this region,
again suggesting an earlier injury.223 The subdural hematoma was described as
being relatively small in size, measuring between one and two tablespoons in
volume. 224 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court dissenters would
subsequently attach significance to this seemingly small volume of subdural
blood. 225 However, this reflects the Courts' ignorance of the fact that subdural fluid
collections in AHT/SBS cases are typically small in volume. 226 At trial, Dr. Erlich
217 Id.
218 People v. Smith, No. BI 16669, slip op. at 8.219 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 7; Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 887.220 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 717-22 (testimony of Dr.
Stephanie Erlich).221 See Mary Case, Forensic Pathology of Childhood Brain Trauma, 18 BRAIN
PATHOLOGY 562, 564 (2008); Mary Case, Inflicted Traumatic Brain Injury in Infants and
Young Children, 18 BRAIN PATHOLOGY 571, 572 (2008) [hereinafter Case, Inflicted
Traumatic Brain Injury).222 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 6.
223 Id.
224 See Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing the amount of
bleeding as "approximately one or two tablespoons"), vacated sub nom. Patrick v. Smith,
550 U.S. 915 (2007).
225 See id.; Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 11 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per
curiam) (noting small asymptomatic subdural hematomas).
226 See Jennian F. Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children:
I. Patterns of Brain Damage, 124 BRAIN 1290, 1292 (2001) (noting that out of 53 cases of
inflicted fatal head trauma only four of the older children had large enough hematomas to
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also testified that there was no evidence of severe swelling of the brain at autopsy
and that the brain had not herniated from swelling.2 27 This finding was consistent
with Etzel experiencing a rapid death, before the brain had time to swell following
trauma. Etzel's brain, however, did evidence some swelling indicating that some
period of time elapsed between the initial trauma to his brain and his death.2 28
Dr. Erlich and another doctor also performed a neuropathological examination
of Etzel's brain. 229 That examination "confirmed the presence of fresh
subarachnoid hemorrhages in the parietal, the occipital areas, the frontal areas, and
in the left temporal area" of the brain.2 30 "They also confirmed the presence of
fresh subdural hemorrhage in the parietal area, as well as an older subdural
hemorrhage in the right parietal area." 231' Based on these findings, Dr. Erlich
confirmed that the cause of death was "trauma to the brain."2 32
The autopsy also revealed a "recent small abrasion, approximately 1/16 by
3/16 of an inch, on [Etzel's] lower skull, upper neck region, and a recent bruise
beneath this abrasion."233 The Ninth Circuit inaccurately understated the diagnostic
importance of Etzel's scalp abrasion and underlying bruise when it opined that the
"scalp abrasion was minimal, and was not even discovered until well into the
autopsy." 2 34 This bruise and abrasion clearly indicated that Etzel had sustained a
blunt impact trauma to the head. Impact trauma to the head is frequently difficult
to detect on visual inspection and may not be seen until the scalp is reflected
during the autopsy.235 Accordingly, this evidence can be easily missed in children
who do not die and are not autopsied.
act as space occupying lesions while 34 had only a "trivial" quantity of subdural blood
invariably described as "thin film").
227 See Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 890.
228 Email from Dr. David Chadwick, Vice-Chairman, Int'l Advisory Bd. Nat'l Ctr. on
Shaken Baby Syndrome, to Dr. Randell Alexander, Member, Int'l Advisory Bd. Nat'l Ctr.
on Shaken Baby Syndrome (Sept. 22, 2012, 4:12 PM) (on file with authors) ("My notes
indicate that the neuropathologist found slit-like ventricles and optic nerve hemorrhage....
The slit[-]like ventricles require some time between injury and death."); Dr. David
Chadwick, Personal Case Notes for Testimony in California v. Smith (Dec. 2, 1997) (on
file with authors) ("Neuropathologist noted slit-like lateral ventricles indicating some brain
swelling."). In fact, the presence of brain swelling is further evidence of direct trauma to
the brain itself, since the brain's response to trauma is to swell. See generally, ABUSIVE
HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC
REFERENCE, supra note 9.
229 People v. Smith, No. B228869, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.; see also Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 727-29
(testimony of Dr. Stephanie Erlich).
233 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
234 Id.
235 See, e.g., Randall Alexander et al., Incidence of Impact Trauma with Cranial
Injuries Ascribed to Shaking, 144 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 724, 724-26 (1990); Duhaime et
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Dr. Erlich testified that she did not observe retinal hemorrhages at autopsy.2 36
Both the defense medical experts at Smith's trial and the Ninth Circuit emphasized
the absence of retinal hemorrhages as a basis for their conclusion that Etzel did not
sustain a shaking injury. 237 But this opinion ignores the extensive medical literature
establishing that retinal hemorrhages are not present in approximately 20% of
AHT/SBS cases.23 8 As Dr. Erlich explained during her trial testimony, the lack of
retinal hemorrhaging did not undermine her diagnosis because it had been well
239documented that retinal hemorrhages are not present in 15-30% of SBS cases.
Dr. Erlich further explained that the fresh blood on Etzel's brain could not be
the result of rebleeding from an earlier trauma nor could it have been caused by
shaking after death. 24 0 Dr. Erlich specifically stated that the medical literature
cannot support the theory of rebleeding of chronic subdural hematomas in
children.241 Because minor trauma cannot cause a rebleed of a chronic subdural in
infants, 242 the older blood on Etzel's brain represented prior trauma. 243 This
conclusion was further supported by the fact that the prior subdural was small,
al., supra note 91, at 409; James R. Gill et al., Fatal Head Injury in Children Younger than
2 Years in New York City and an Overview of the Shaken Baby Syndrome, 133 ARCHIVES
PATHOLOGY LAB MED. 619 (2009).
236 Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 887.
237 Id. at 887-89. Ironically, most defense medical witnesses and legal commentators
attempt to dismiss the significance of retinal hemorrhages when they are present,
suggesting that they are caused by means other than shaking or are not diagnostic of
trauma. See, e.g., Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury, supra note 110, at 218;
Leestma, supra note 113, at 599-600; Miller & Miller, supra note 109, at 169;
Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution, supra note 23, at 516.
238 The absence of retinal hemorrhages does not preclude a diagnosis of AHT/SBS
because, as numerous researchers have documented, retinal hemorrhages are not present in
approximately 15-20% of AHT/SBS cases. See, e.g., Duhaime et al., supra note 91, at 410;
Geddes et al., supra note 226, at 1294 (reporting presence in 71% of fatal cases); Craig E.
Munger et al., Ocular and Associated Neuropathologic Observations in Suspected
Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 193 (1993);
Ralph S. Riffenburg & Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran, The Eyes of Child Abuse Victims:
Autopsy Findings, 36 J. FORENSIC Scis. 741, 742 (1991) (reporting retinal hemorrhages in
forty-seven of seventy-seven suspected child abuse deaths); Brandon Togioka et al.,
Retinal Hemorrhages and Shaken Baby Syndrome: An Evidence-Based Review, 37 J.
EMERGENCY MED. 98, 100 (2009) (providing a systematic review of the medical literature
on retinal hemorrhages and noting a 53-80% incidence in AHT); Dimitra Tzioumi & R.
Kim Oates, Subdural Hematomas in Children Under 2 Years. Accidental or Inflicted? A
10-Year Experience, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1105, 1108 (1998).
239 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1276-78, (testimony of Dr.
Stephanie Erlich).
240 See id. at 1298-99.
241 Id. at 1270-71.
242 Id. at 1303-05.
243 Id.
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avascular, and there was no mass effect from the prior bleeding to support a
rebleed claim. 24 4
(b) Dr. Erlich's Opinion Regarding Etzel's Cause ofDeath
Based on these findings, both Dr. Erlich and the supervising medical
examiner, Dr. Carpenter, concluded that Etzel died as a result of head trauma
attributed to SBS.24 5 Dr. Erlich indicated that the mechanism of death was the
tearing of brain tissue and long nerve fibers within Etzel's brain and that bleeding
over the brain's surface was a marker for this type of brain injury and
mechanism.246 Later in her testimony, she indicated there were three mechanisms
by which SBS causes death: (1) mass effects from subdural bleeding put pressure
on the brainstem, (2) swelling of the brain causes herniation, or (3) direct trauma to
the brainstem. 2 47 Dr. Erlich noted that she did not submit sections of Etzel's
brainstem for microscopic examination because injury would not be evident on
microscopic examination if the child died quickly, and this would not have assisted
in her diagnosis because the examiners "wouldn't have seen anything anyway." 248
244 Id. at 1319-20. For further discussion of the rebleeding claim and the lack of
scientific support for this frequent "alternative theory" proposed by the defense, see
generally Barbara L. Knox et al., Subdural Hematoma Rebleeding, in ABUSIVE HEAD
TRAUMA: POCKET ATLAS (Kay Rauth-Farley & L. Frasier eds.) (forthcoming 2013).
245 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011) (per curiam).
246 See Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 730-31, 1324 (testimony
of Dr. Stephanie Erlich).
247 Id. at 801-02. Specifically, trauma to areas of the brain that control heartbeat and
respiration leads to a quick death that would not necessarily be recognizable through
microscopic examination of the brainstem. Id. at 1297-99.
248 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007); see also Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at
803-05 (testimony of Dr. Stephanie Erlich) (noting that changes to the brainstem would not
have been detectable unless the baby survived for a period of time). Dr. Erlich's conclusion
is confirmed by the medical literature. See S.M. Gentleman et al., Axonal Injury: A
Universal Consequence of Fatal Closed Head Injury?, 89 ACTA NEUROPTHOLOGICA 537,
537, 541 (1995) (noting that the frequency of axonal damage had been vastly
underestimated using conventional techniques and newer techniques using Beta Amyloid
Protein Precursor (BAPP) were revealing much more prevalent axonal damage). Dr.
Chadwick's trial testimony described the advent of new staining techniques-although he
did not mention the BAPP technique by name-noting their capacity to reveal this type of
brainstem damage, but that they were not yet widely available. See infra notes 283-285 and
accompanying text. Had BAPP staining been more widely available at the time of Etzel's
death, the likelihood of detection of axonal damage would have been substantially greater,
although far from certain due to his rapid death. See, e.g., P. Shannon et al., Axonal Injury
and the Neuropathology of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 95 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 625,
630 (1998) (indicating that at the time of this study, which used BAPP staining techniques
to evaluate the brains of fatal abuse victims, there had been only a single series previously
reported using silver stains-findings of this study identified axonal injury in the spinal
cord suggesting that flexion-extension injury to the cervical spinal column may be caused
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Dr. Erlich also analogized this situation to adult patients who suffer strokes and die
right away, noting that doctors will know clinically that the person had a stroke,
but would not see changes in the neurons of the brain immediately, although they
might have seen such changes if the person had instead survived for several
hours. 249 Today, more advanced staining techniques that might have identified the
precise locations of Etzel's microscopic nerve tears are increasingly available to
medical examiners and neuropathologists. 25 0 However, at the time of his autopsy,
Etzel's brain evidenced swelling indicating that some period of time elapsed
between the initial trauma to his brain and his death.251
The Ninth Circuit and the Smith dissenters concluded that the absence of
direct evidence of microscopic tears in Etzel's brainstem demonstrated that there
was no medical evidence of traumatic injury from shaking or impact trauma from
which the jury could reliably determine guilt. On this critical point, the judges and
justices were wrong-both legally and medically. Legally, both the expert witness
testimony and the findings of blood markers for traumatic injury provided
abundant evidence supporting the medical conclusions about the cause of Etzel's
death. Moreover, this testimony was entirely consistent with the available medical
evidence and literature both at the time of the trial and today.
In contrast, the six justices who joined in the Smith per curiam opinion
correctly recognized that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's assertion that these [prosecution]
experts 'reached [their] conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain
itself of the cause of death' is simply false." 252 These justices understood that the
injury findings and medical opinions were medically consistent with AHT/SBS
because "[t]he autopsy revealed indications of recent trauma to Etzel's brain, such
as subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging, hemorrhaging around the optic
nerves, and the presence of a blood clot between the brain's hemispheres" and
these "affirmative indications of trauma formed the basis of the experts' opinion
that Etzel died from shaking so severe that his brainstem tore." 253 The justices also
understood why direct evidence of injury to the brain tissue was not presented,
noting that "the experts explained why the location of the tear was undetectable:
'Etzel's death happened so quickly that the effects of the trauma did not have time
during shaking); F.E. Sheriff et al., Markers of Axonal Injury in Post Mortem Human
Brain, 88 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 433, 433-34 (1994) (noting minimal survival time of
2.5 hours for detection of axonal swelling in adults using BAPP staining). Similar results
have been induced in an animal model. See Endre Czeiter et al., Traumatic Axonal Injury in
the Spinal Cord Evoked by Traumatic Brain Injury, 25 J. NEUROTRAUMA 205, 206-10
(2008) (noting the implications this finding has for SBS).
249 See Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 766-67 (testimony of Dr.
Stephanie Erlich). Similarly, people who die of heart attacks do not show evidence of this
in their heart tissue if they die immediately because it takes time for damage to the heart
tissue to be seen. Id. at 805.250 See sources cited supra note 248.
251 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.252 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011) (per curiam).
253 Id.
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to develop.' According to the prosecutions' experts, there was simply no
opportunity for swelling to occur around the brainstem before Etzel died." 2 54 Most
importantly, they understood that the lack of evidence visualizing the location of
these microscopic tears did not undermine the accuracy of the AHT/SBS diagnosis.
2. Testimony from the Supervising Medical Examiner, Dr. Carpenter
(a) Dr. Carpenter's Qualifications and Findings
Dr. Carpenter, a medical examiner board-certified in anatomic, clinical, and
forensic pathology, who had performed 3,000 to 4,000 autopsies, agreed with Dr.
Erlich that Etzel did not die from SIDS; he died from brain trauma.255 Dr.
Carpenter explained that if his death had resulted from SIDS, there would have
been no internal trauma, no bruises, and no abrasions.256
(b) Dr. Carpenter's Opinion Regarding Etzel's Cause ofDeath
Dr. Carpenter testified that the bleeding on top of Etzel's brain was caused by
shaking so that "there was a whiplash action of the head on top of the body with
the back of the head slamming into the back and the front of the head slamming
into the chest repeatedly so that the vessels on the top of the brain tore."257
According to Dr. Carpenter, Etzel's "brain was so damaged from this violent
shaking that death occurred relatively quickly, within . . . 30 minutes . . . [and]
there was no significant delay between the shaking and the brain damage." 2 58 As
Dr. Carpenter explained,
[T]here are two ways that ... shaking to the head can cause death. One
way is that the shaking itself is so severe that the brain tears in vital areas
that control the heartbeat and the breathing. And then the bleeding can be
small and won't amount to that much. The other way that a baby's body
can die from shaking or from head trauma is for the vessels to tear, but
for the brain not to be damaged that much. And for the blood to
accumulate on top of the head. There is not enough room in the skull for
254 Id. (citation omitted).
215 Id. at 4-5.
256 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000). A
SIDS diagnosis is precluded by Etzel's significant internal injuries because under medical
guidelines promulgated prior to 1996, and still used today, SIDS can only be diagnosed in a
child who had a "negative autopsy" (i.e., an autopsy that had no other findings that could
explain cause of death). See, e.g., Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Distinguishing
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome from Child Abuse Fatalities, 94 PEDIATRICS 124, 125
(1994) (listing sources and noting the requirement that the autopsy show no gross or
microscopic evidence of head injury or intracranial trauma).
257 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 6.
258 Id.
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the brain and the blood. So the brain is pressed downward into the spinal
canal and is crushed and th[en] dies.25 9
Dr. Carpenter explained that in Etzel's case there was not enough
accumulation of blood to press the brain downward and cause death from pressure
on the brain, so Etzel's death was caused by direct trauma to vital areas of the
brain.260 Dr. Carpenter indicated that "he could not rule out the possibility of other
blows to the head, but that there was no clear evidence of such blows except for
the one small area of bruising" on Etzel's lower skull.26 1
Dr. Carpenter could not rule out the possibility that a fall from the sofa could
account for one of Etzel's injuries, the subdural hemorrhages. 262 But he also
testified that Etzel's "injuries could not have been caused by the administration of
CPR."263 Dr. Carpenter stated that retinal hemorrhages and fractures are often seen
in infants who are shaken and Etzel had neither injury,2 6 and that it is possible for
subdural hemorrhages and subarachnoid hemorrhages to occur as a result of birth
trauma. 265 However, the medical research on subdural and subarachnoid
hemorrhages indicates that birth-related hemorrhages do sometimes occur but that
they could not account for Etzel's injuries because they generally (1) are
259 Id. at 6-7. There are several additional ways for brain injury and death to occur.
See R.A. Minns, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Theoretical and Evidential Controversies, 35 J.
ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS EDINBURGH 5, 10 (2005) (documenting four mechanisms for fatal
trauma including the mechanism described by the prosecution's experts at Smith's trial,
and discussed infra note 334 and accompanying text). See generally Geddes et al., supra
note 226 (studying fifty-three nonaccidental head injuries in children and finding skull
fractures, acute subdural bleeding, retinal hemorrhages to be the most common injuries).
26oPeople v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 7; see also supra notes 224-226, 246-
247 and infra notes 329-331 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Erlich's testimony
describing how AHT/SBS typically does not present itself with a large volume of subdural
blood causing a mass effect on the brain, but instead serves as a "marker" for rotational
injury to the brain involving shaking or shaking combined with impact).261 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 7.262 Id. On cross-examination Dr. Carpenter acknowledged that one of Etzel's injuries,
subdural hemorrhages, could occur from a fall. Id. at 8. The medical literature indicates that
such findings are exceedingly rare, however, and are typically focal in nature, confined to
the location of the impact. See, e.g., Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., Nonaccidental Head
Injury in Infants-The "Shaken-Baby Syndrome," 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1822, 1822
(1998) ("[M]ost investigators agree that trivial forces, such as those involving routine play,
infant swings, or falls from a low height are insufficient to cause [SBS]."). Etzel's subdural
hemhorrage and subarachnoid hemhorrage injuries are diffuse and indicative of a more
global injury to the brain produced from rotational trauma seen with SBS.
263 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 7.264 Id at 7-8. Laura K. Brennan et al., Neck Injuries in Young Pediatric Homicide
Victims, 3 J. NEUROSURGERY PEDIATRICS 232, 232 (2009) (finding that retinal
hemorrhages are present in 80% of cases and 30-50% have skeletal injuries of various
ages).
265 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 8.
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asymptomatic, (2) resolve after one month, (3) do not result in sudden deterioration
and collapse, and (4) cannot result in diffuse acute bleeding or bleeding in a
different location in the brain.2 66
3. Testimony from the Child Abuse Expert Pediatrician-Dr. Chadwick
(a) Dr. Chadwick's Qualifications and Findings
In addition to Drs. Erlich and Carpenter, Dr. David Chadwick, a pediatrician
specializing in abuse, also testified for the prosecution. 2 67 Dr. Chadwick, who had
been personally involved as a treating physician in fifty cases of SBS and AHT,
half of which involved fatal outcomes, provided some of the most relevant and
significant medical evidence. 2 68 Thus, it is odd that the reviewing courts have
consistently ignored his testimony. Like Drs. Erlich and Carpenter (and defense-
retained witness Dr. Siegler), Dr. Chadwick ruled out the possibility that Etzel died
from SIDS because, based on Etzel's other significant injuries, he did not have the
requisite "negative autopsy" for a SIDS diagnosis.269
(b) Dr. Chadwick's Opinion Regarding Etzel's Cause ofDeath
Dr. Chadwick explained the precise mechanism of Etzel's death by describing
how shaking infants creates acceleration and deceleration of the brain, which
causes nerve fibers in the brain stem to tear.27 0 When these nerve fibers tear they
cease to function and the brain undergoes major changes, including the interruption
266 Birth-related subdural hemorrhages typically resolve by one month of age and are
distinct from both the acute hemorrhages and the older subdural hematoma found in Etzel's
brain. The scattered pattern of acute subdural and subarachnoid bleeding throughout Etzel's
brain is also inconsistent with the theory that a chronic subdural from birth has rebled. See
E.H. Whitby et al., Frequency and Natural History of Subdural Hemorrhages in Babies
and Relation to Obstetric Factors, 362 LANCET 846, 847-50 (2004) (controlled research
concluding that birth-related subdural hemorrhages are rare, benign, have clinically
insignificant sequelae, and resolve by one month); see also Surya N. Gupta et al.,
Intracranial Hemorrhage in Term Newborns: Management and Outcomes, 40 PEDIATRIC
NEUROLOGY 1, 11 (2009) (summarizing the typical treatment for intracranial hemorrhages
and suggesting possible improvements); Knox et al., supra note 244 (summarizing research
on rebleeding theory and concluding that rebleeds in children do not result in the spectrum
of injuries and sudden collapse seen with AHT); Christopher B. Looney et al., Intracranial
Hemorrhage in Asymptomatic Neonates: Prevalence on MR Images and Relationship to
Obstetric and Neonatal Risk Factors, 242 RADIOLOGY 535, 538 (2007) (finding that
seventeen out of eighty-eight asymptomatic neonates born via vaginal delivery had
subdural hemorrhages).
267 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 5 (2011) (per curiam).
268 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1436-37 (testimony of Dr.
Chadwick).
269 Id. at 1440-44.
270 Id. at 1448-49.
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of vital functions controlling breathing and heartbeat, which leads to death. 271 This
injury mechanism was supported by evidence of the petechiae (spots caused by
minor hemorrhaging) found in.Etzel's lungs which indicated a disruption of Etzel's
breathing mechanism and that he had been struggling to get air.2 7 2
With respect to the timing of the injury, a critical question for the jury, Dr.
Chadwick testified that Etzel could not have sustained this type of injury, remained
asymptomatic for hours, and then suddenly collapsed and died.2 7 3 Dr. Chadwick
supported this conclusion with both his extensive clinical experience and the
medical literature documenting that children with severe head trauma immediately
become unconscious or comatose, although brain death may occur hours or even
days later. 274 Dr. Chadwick indicated there were many cases in which children
271 Id. at 1448-49, 1476-77, 1480-82.
272 Id. at 1495.2731 Id. at 1460-61.
274 Id. at 1450-54. In AHT/SBS cases, defendants and their medical witnesses
frequently assert that infants with severe or fatal head injuries experience a "lucid interval"
of significant duration between the traumatic injury and when the child becomes severely
symptomatic and unconscious. Medical research and clinical experience, however, do not
support these claims but instead confirm the testimony offered by Dr. Chadwick-that
children with severe and fatal head injuries do not experience significant periods of lucidity
and are not asymptomatic. See Adamsbaum et al., supra note 49, at 550, 554; Mary E.
Case, Head Injury in Child Abuse, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: A CLINICAL GUIDE AND
REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 87, 95 [hereinafter Case, Head Injury in Child Abuse]; Mary
E. Case et al., Position Paper on Fatal Abusive Head Injuries in Infants and Young
Children, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 112, 118-19 (2001); Duhaime et al.,
supra note 262, at 1825; Geddes et al., supra note 226, at 1303; M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval
Duration Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants
and Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723, 724 (1998); Tom. D. Lyon et al., Medical
Evidence of Physical Abuse in Infants and Young Children, 28 PAC. L.J. 93, 146, 163
(1996); Starling et al., Analysis of Perpetrator Admissions, supra note 49, at, 456-57;
Starling et al., Abusive Head Trauma, supra note 49, at 261; Krista Y. Willman et al.,
Restricting the Time of Injury in Fatal Inflicted Head Injuries, 21 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 929, 938-39 (1997). Both Dr. Starling and Dr. Adamsbaum's research confirms
that perpetrators who confess to shaking and other forms of AHT consistently report that
children are immediately symptomatic. Adamsbaum, supra note 49, at 551; Starling et al.,
Analysis of Perpetrator Admissions, supra note 49, at 456. In fact, Dr. Gilliland's research
found that in all cases where there was a person (other than the suspect) present at the time
of injury, the child was immediately symptomatic. Gilliland, supra, at 724. But see Kristy
B. Arbogast et al., Initial Neurologic Presentation in Young Children Sustaining Inflicted
and Unintentional Fatal Head Injuries, 116 PEDIATRICS 180, 180-84 (2005) (pointing out
that the Willman study involved only two infants and arguing that lucidity does not imply
that children are asymptomatic because the Glasgow Coma Scale does not measure
common symptoms such as vomiting, irritability, or subtle changes in alertness which
means that children with less severe injuries from AHT may exhibit symptoms that do not
precipitate a medical crisis and consequently may not be brought in for medical treatment
and their head trauma may be undiagnosed); Antoinette L. Laskey et al., Occult Head
Trauma in Young Suspected Victims of Physical Abuse, 144 PEDIATRICS 719 (2004).
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sustaining these types of injuries were dead on arrival at the hospital.275 Based on
this evidence, he opined that Etzel's death had occurred very rapidly.276 Dr.
Chadwick testified that if the injury is sufficient to cause the infant to stop
breathing because it affects the vital centers, then the baby will die in five to ten
minutes.2 77
Dr. Chadwick testified that the blood on Etzel's brain provided additional
evidence of a traumatic injury. 278 He also noted that his diagnosis was not
undermined by the absence of retinal hemorrhages because these findings are not
present in approximately 20% of AHT/SBS cases. 2 79 Dr. Chadwick testified that
Etzel's optic nerve hemorrhages were consistent with SBS and the older
hemorrhage in the optic nerve likely indicated a prior occasion of similar injury.280
Dr. Chadwick also ruled out rebleeding from the older subdural hematoma as a
cause for the acute blood in Etzel's head28 ' and testified that a short fall from a
sofa could not explain Etzel's fatal injuries.
Dr. Chadwick explained that tears in an infant brain's nerve fibers are
microscopic and difficult to locate during autopsy.2 83 But he strongly rejected the
suggestion that because doctors could not locate these microscopic tears, they
could not make a definitive cause of death determination.284 In his view, this same
flawed logic should be compared to the (equally unsupportable) assumption that
doctors cannot accurately diagnose cause of death for infants who die of
overheating in cars because they do not present anatomic or physiological evidence
that is specific to (can only be explained by) overheating.285 Finally, Dr. Chadwick
clarified that Etzel's lack of neck injuries did not undermine his diagnosis because
neck injuries are identified in only 10% of AHT/SBS cases.2 86
275 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1480 (testimony of Dr.
Chadwick).
276 Id.
277 Id. In other circumstances, however, death might occur hours or days later as a
result of brain swelling. Id. at 1477.
278 Id. at 1446-49, 1466, 1474 (explaining that this blood is not what hurts or kills the
baby, rather it is the damage to the brain itself and the blood is.an indicator of this injury);
see also id. at 1467-68 (describing how the older bleeding on Etzel's brain indicated an
earlier less severe injury of a similar nature).
279 Id. at 1463-65, 1490.
280 Id. at 1467-68.
281 Id. at 1446-47.
282 Id. at 1455-59 (describing his own research and publications in this arena and that
of others). Since this trial testimony, Dr. Chadwick has published a meta-analysis of the
short-fall research. See Chadwick et al., supra note 167.
283 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1448-49 (testimony of Dr.
Chadwick) (describing new techniques to identify these injuries not used in this autopsy
and not widely available at the time).
284 Id. at 1483-84
285 Id.
286 Id. at 1491-93.
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4. Testimony from Defense-Retained Witness-Dr. Siegler
(a) Dr. Siegler's Qualifications and Findings
The defense called two experts at trial.287 The first expert, Dr. Richard Siegler,
a forensic pathologist,288 agreed that Etzel did not die from SIDS but died from
brain trauma. 289 The California Court of Appeal described Dr. Siegler's
qualifications as follows:
On voir dire, the prosecutor established that Dr. Seigler's extensive
experience was not in forensic pathology, but in general, clinical and
anatomic pathology. Ninety-five percent of his publications ha[d] been
on cancer. He had not authored any articles dealing with child abuse or
forensic pathology in determining the causes of death in infants.
Although he had been a medical examiner in Philadelphia in 1960,
shaken baby syndrome was unknown at that time. He had not been
involved in any autopsies where the cause of death was found to be
shaken baby syndrome. He had performed 50 autopsies on children with
brain trauma over the last 25 years.29 0
(b) Dr. Siegler's Opinion Regarding Etzel's Cause ofDeath
In Dr. Siegler's view, Etzel's death was not caused by shaking because there
were no retinal hemorrhages. 291 As discussed above, Dr. Siegler's testimony is not
supported by the medical evidence introduced at trial or the medical literature. The
absence of retinal hemorrhages does not preclude a diagnosis of shaking or AHT
because, as numerous researchers have documented, retinal hemorrhages are not
292present in approximately 20% of AHT/SBS cases. Moreover, as Dr. Siegler
subsequently acknowledged from the witness stand, the absence of retinal
hemorrhages cannot exclude a diagnosis of SB S.293
Dr. Siegler testified that Etzel's brain trauma did not happen shortly before his
death because he did not see evidence of a fresh trauma.294 The Ninth Circuit
inexplicably misstated Dr. Siegler's testimony on this vital point. According to the
appellate court, Dr. Siegler opined that Etzel must have died from the lingering
effects of earlier brain trauma of unknown but quite possibly innocent cause.295
287 Id. at 1469.
288 Id.
289 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See sources cited supra note 238.
293 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 9.
294 Id. at 9-10.
295 Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v.
Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
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This is not an accurate description of Dr. Siegler's testimony. A review of the
transcript of Dr. Siegler's testimony reveals that his opinions pertaining to "older
trauma" were based on the presence of the older subdural hemorrhages, which he
(mistakenly) described as broadly present (i.e., diffuse) in Etzel's brain.296 As
noted above, the older subdural hemorrhages found in Etzel's brain were not
diffuse, but were instead focal (confined to one area of the brain). It is clear from
the trial transcript that Dr. Siegler could not account for the diffuse acute (fresh)
hemorrhages described in the neuropathology report and diagrammed by Dr. Erlich
at trial. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's speculation that Etzel likely died from older brain
trauma of "possibly innocent" origin is unsupported by Dr. Siegler's testimony or
any other medical evidence presented at trial, or any medical literature. 2 97
Finally, although both the Ninth Circuit and the Smith dissenters ignored this
fact, Dr. Siegler conceded that his medical opinions were based solely on
photographs taken by the neuropathologist. 298 He also admitted that he had not
even considered the evidence presented by Dr. Erlich and Dr. Carpenter-which
showed extensive fresh bleeding to Etzel's brain-in reaching his conclusion that
there was no medical evidence of fresh trauma.299
5. Testimony from the Defense-Retained Witness-Dr. Goldie
(a) Dr. Goldie's Qualifications and Findings
The defendant's second expert, Dr. William Goldie, a pediatric neurologist,
disagreed with all of the other experts and testified that.Etzel's death was due to
SIDS. 30 0 According to Dr. Goldie, jaundice, a heart murmur, and low birth weight
were all factors that made Etzel predisposed to a SIDS death.301 Without support
from the medical evidence or the medical literature and in contrast to the other
296 See id.
297 See supra notes 219-232, 240-244 and accompanying text.
298 See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 5 (2011) (per curiam).
299 People v. Smith, No. BI 18869, slip op. at 9-10.
300 Id. at 10.
301 Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, Dr. Goldie described some of the
characteristics that led him to conclude that Etzel died of SIDS. Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 888,
vacated sub nom. Patrick, 550 U.S. at 915. Dr. Goldie specified, "With SIDS, the infant
usually would appear normal, but then he or she suddenly would die." Id. Furthermore, Dr.
Goldie stated, "SIDS occurred more frequently in babies who, like Etzel, were small for
their age, who had mothers who had multiple children already or smoked or used drugs,
and, most importantly, who had been placed face-down on their stomachs." Id. Finally, Dr.
Goldie indicated, "Males were more likely victims than females." Id. But the medical
research on SIDS diagnosis does not support Dr. Goldie's conclusion that these factors,
individually or in combination, support a finding that Etzel died of SIDS. See Comm. on
Child Abuse & Neglect, supra note 256 (explaining that SIDS can only be diagnosed in a
child who had a "negative autopsy" and therefore a SIDS diagnosis was precluded by
Etzel's significant internal injuries (i.e., the presence of old and acute subdural hemorrhage,
old and acute optic nerve hemorrhage, and abrasion trauma to the neck)).
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experts, Dr. Goldie opined that some of the acute bleeding on Etzel's brain was the
result of CPR302 and that, in the alternative, premature infants sometimes bleed into
their heads without cause.303
(b) Dr. Goldie's Opinion Regarding Etzel's Cause ofDeath
Dr. Goldie, who was not board certified in neuropathology, clinical pathology
or forensic pathology, concluded that the pathologists had inaccurately determined
the cause of Etzel's death304 because, in his opinion, SBS can only be diagnosed
based on a finding of either massive brain bleeding or massive brain swelling (at
least when the brain stem does not show damage).305
The medical evidence presented at trial and the medical literature all
contradict Dr. Goldie's opinion. First, massive brain bleeding is not a valid
diagnostic criterion for AHT/SBS. The volume of blood in these cases is typically
306small, one to two tablespoons, just as in Etzel's case. Second, Dr. Goldie's
testimony on brain swelling ignores the medical evidence indicating that Etzel died
from injury to his brain stem that disrupted the respiratory center of his brain and
the fact that because the brain stops swelling when a child dies, the lack of
swelling is medically consistent with brain death occurring shortly after injury.307
E. The Smith Dissenters Interpret the Evidence
1. The Dissenters' Misguided Concern that Eztel's Injury Could not be Located
According to Justice Ginsburg, "[w]hat is now known about SBS casts grave
doubt on the charge leveled against Smith." 308 In addition to this inaccurate general
assessment of the current state of medical knowledge, the dissenters reviewed the
specific medical evidence presented by the five experts who testified at the Smith
trial and inaccurately concluded that "[flew of the[] signs of SBS were present
here." 309 This assumption echoes the Ninth Circuit's mistaken finding that the jury
based its verdict on the opinions of medical experts who had improperly "reached
[their] conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of
death." 310
302 People v. Smith, No. B 118869, slip op. at 10. There is no medical evidence to
support Dr. Goldie's assertion that CPR can cause subdural or subarachnoid hemorrhage.
See Evan W. Matshes, Emma 0. Lew, Do Resuscitation-Related Injuries Kill Infants and
Children?, 31 AM J FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 178 (2010).
303 Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 888.
304 People v. Smith, No. BI 18869, slip op. at 10.
305 Id.
306 See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 227-228, 247-251, 258-259, 270-275 and accompanying text.308 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
309 Id.
310 Id. at 7 (majority opinion).
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The Smith dissenters begin with the complaint that the "autopsy revealed no
physical evidence of such injury, either grossly or microscopically," that "Dr.
Carpenter was unable to state which particular areas of the brain were injured, and
the neuropathologist found no evidence of specific brain injury," that "[n]o doctor
located any tear," and that "the examining physicians did not cut open Etzel's
brainstem, or submit it to neuropathology." 3 1 1
Justice Ginsburg's concerns illustrate how courts can adopt and then advance
a profound misunderstanding of the medical evidence presented at trial in
AHT/SBS cases. First, there was no gross physical evidence of the tears to Etzel's
brain because they were too small to see and occurred at a microscopic level.3 12
Second, the pathologists who conducted Etzel's autopsy did not section his brain
for microscopic examination because this procedure would not have helped them
"locate[] any tear."3 13 As Dr. Erlich stated at trial, dissection was not necessary
because, given the techniques available at the time, they "wouldn't have seen
anything anyway." 314 In fact, Dr. Chadwick described the advent of new staining
techniques with the capacity to reveal this type of brainstem damage, but noted that
at the time of Etzel's autopsy they were not yet widely available.3 15 Etzel did not
survive long enough for changes to his brain to become detectable using standard
techniques, 316 despite the fact that the bleeding around his brain clearly indicated
injury to the brain itself.317
311 Id. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
312 Id. But see supra notes 245-251 and infra notes 329-332 and accompanying text.
313 Id. But see supra notes 245-251 and infra notes 329-332 and accompanying text.
314 See Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick
v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007). This opinion is confirmed by the fact that in 1996 the
staining techniques generally available to detect such injury-hematoxylin-eosin (H&E)
stains-required the victim to survive for nearly fifteen hours. See Gentleman et al., supra
note 248, at 537 (noting that the frequency of axonal damage had been vastly
underestimated using conventional silver techniques and newer techniques using BAPP
were revealing much more prevalent axonal damage).
315 See sources cited supra note 248 (discussing new techniques). Although Dr.
Chadwick did not mention the BAPP technique by name, had BAPP staining been more
widely available at the time of Etzel's death, the likelihood of detection of axonal damage
would have been substantially greater, although far from certain due to his rapid death. But
see Manfred Oehmichen et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome: Re-examination of Diffuse Axonal
Injury as Cause of Death, 116 ACTA NEUROPATFIOLOGICA 317, 317-29 (2008) (not
detecting this pattern of injury and ascribing multiple causes for the disruption of breathing
mechanisms resulting from shaking). For an excellent overview of these issues, see Lucy
B. Rorke-Adams, Neuropathology of Abusive -Head Trauma, in CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 413; see also J.F.
Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children: II. Microscopic Brain
Injury in Infants, 124 BRAIN 1299, 1299-306 (2001).
316 Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1449 (testimony of Dr. David
L. Chadwick).
3 See supra notes 219-221, 246-251, 278 and accompanying text.
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Although the Smith dissenters appear confused on this point, the fact that the
doctors who performed Etzel's autopsy in 1996 could not visualize the
microscopic tears that caused Etzel to stop breathing does not mean, as the Ninth
Circuit asserted, that "there was no evidence . . . of the cause of death."3 '8 This
argument is both illogical and unscientific. It is akin to asserting that the advent of
a new medical technology enabling physicians to more accurately pinpoint the
location of a microscopic injury undermines the validity of all previous diagnoses.
Physicians have a long and widely known history of accurately diagnosing a range
of diseases that only recently can be visualized using new imaging and diagnostic
technologies. The argument also fails as a matter of basic science. Diseases can be
diagnosed, and even cured, without a precise understanding of the entire disease
process. To cite just one famous example, scurvy was first described by
Hippocrates. 319 By the mid-eighteenth century, the disease was successfully treated
with fresh food (particularly citrus fruit).320 The discovery of vitamin C deficiency
as the precise biological disease mechanism did not occur until 1932.321
2. The Dissenters' Five Specific Concerns Regarding the Medical Evidence
In addition to their specific concern that Etzel's brain tears could not be
visualized, the Smith dissenters list five general problems with the medical
evidence that, in their view, "cast grave doubt" on the accuracy of the jury verdict.
Because these general concerns will likely be repeated by defense-retained medical
witnesses, counsel, and judges in future AHT/SBS cases, each will be evaluated
below.
(a) "Etzel's Subdural Hemorrhage and Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Were
Minimal"3 22
This statement, although technically accurate, cannot undermine the validity
of the AHT/SBS diagnosis and reflects a lay misunderstanding of the mechanism
of AHT injuries. The autopsy revealed that Etzel had subdural hemorrhages3 23 and
subarachnoid hemorrhages 324 located between the two halves of his brain in the
posterior fossa (i.e., at the base of his skull) and on the under surface of his
brain.325 The autopsy also revealed older blood, which indicated an earlier brain
injury that could have occurred days or weeks prior to his death. 326 Acute
318 Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 890 (emphasis omitted).319 Emmanuil Magiorkinis et al., Scurvy: Past, Present and Future, 22 EUR. J.
INTERNAL MED. 147,147 (2011).
320 Id. at 147-48.
321 Id. at 149-50.
322 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam).




hemorrhages were also found in both optic nerve sheaths, as well as older blood in
this region, again suggesting an earlier injury.
Etzel's subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages were described as being small
in size, measuring between one and two tablespoons in volume.3 2 8 But as Dr. Erlich
explained, subdural bleeding in AHT cases need not manifest as large, mass effect
collections of blood that put pressure on the brain and lead to death.329 Instead, the
presence of such blood acts as a "marker" for a specific mechanism of traumatic
brain injury-the rotational acceleration-deceleration of the head and brain.330 This
injury mechanism tears bridging veins causing the bleed and concurrently causing
direct injury to the brain tissue but does not result in significant bleeding.331 This is
consistent with the extensive medical literature and Dr. Carpenter's testimony
explaining that Etzel's death was caused by "direct trauma to vital areas of the
brain." 3 32
(b) "There Was No Brain Swelling"333
This statement reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how shaking can
cause infant death. At trial, Dr. Carpenter specifically testified that shaking can
cause death in different ways. 33 4 First, shaking can create a large bleed that creates
327 Id.
328 Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 887.
329 See supra notes 226, 246-247, 259-260, 278 and accompanying text..
330 See Case, Inflicted Traumatic Brain Injury, supra note 221, at 576.
3 See, e.g., id. at 573 (noting that subdurals may involve less than 5-10 mL of
blood); Geddes et al., supra note 226, at 1291-94 (noting out of fifty-three cases of
inflicted fatal head trauma only four of the older children had large enough hematomas to
act as space occupying lesions while thirty-four had only a "trivial" quantity of subdural
blood invariably described as "thin film").
332 People v. Smith, No. 118869, slip op. at 7. It is also consistent with Dr.
Chadwick's testimony. See supra notes 270-272, 278 and accompanying text.
333 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
334 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 7. The doctors at Etzel's trial primarily
discussed the two mechanisms as listed above. Another mechanism, which was not
described, involves a primary injury to the brain (e.g., torn or damaged brain tissue)
causing the brain to swell in response to this injury. A second mechanism is via hypoxic-
ischemic injury to the brain. In these cases, trauma causes a disruption in breathing that
produces a lack of oxygen and hypoxic insult. The medical evidence presented by all three
prosecution experts indicated that Etzel died quickly as a result of this second injury
mechanism. But this hypoxic insult can also occur over a protracted time frame with
hypoxia being caused by ongoing swelling. Other medical literature describes additional
mechanisms of injury and ongoing research continues to elucidate additional primary and
secondary injury mechanisms. See Minns, supra note 259, at 11-12 (describing four
principle patterns of presentation). Ongoing research into the brain's biochemical responses
to traumatic injury is providing additional information regarding injury pathways. See
Rachel P. Berger & Noel Zuckerbraun, Biochemical Markers, in MILD TRAUMATIC BRAIN
206 [No. I
2013] FALSE "SCIENTIFIC" CONTROVERSY OVER SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 207
pressure on the brain causing the brain to herniate. But another way is that "the
shaking is so severe that the brain tears in vital areas that control the heartbeat and
the breathing." 335 As noted above, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Erlich, and Dr. Chadwick all
agreed that the mechanism of Etzel's death was the tearing of brain tissue and long
nerve fibers within his brain and that bleeding over the brain's surface was a
marker for this type of brain injury.336 Thus, Etzel died from injury to the brain
stem that disrupted the respiratory center of his brain. Because extensive medical
evidence supports the finding that the brain stops swelling when the child dies, the
lack of brain swelling is medically consistent with brain death occurring shortly
after injury 337 and Dr. Chadwick testified that Etzel's death had occurred very
rapidly. 338 According to Dr. Chadwick, if the injury is sufficient to cause the infant
to stop breathing because it affects the vital centers, the baby can die in five to ten
339
minutes.
(c) "There Was ... No Retinal Hemorrhage in Either Eye" 34 0
This concern is likely derived from Dr. Siegler's testimony that Etzel's death
was not caused by shaking because there were no retinal hemorrhages. 34 1 The lack
of retinal hemorrhages in one of every five AHT/SBS cases itself establishes that
this finding cannot undermine the abuse diagnosis.342 Because this fact was well
known at the time, presented at trial, and even conceded by Dr. Siegler,343 it is
difficult to understand why both the Ninth Circuit and the Smith dissenters ignored
it.
INJURY IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: FROM BASIC SCIENCE TO CLINICAL
MANAGEMENT 145-61 (Michael W. Kirkwood & Keith Owen Yates eds., 2012).
3 People v. Smith, No. B118869, slip op. at 6-7. Brain swelling takes time to occur
and does not continue after death, so if the child dies quickly following trauma then the
swelling would be minimal and would not be the direct cause of brain herniation or death.
Dr. Carpenter's opinions are confirmed in subsequent research, including two articles
published in 2001 by Dr. Jennian Geddes describing the pathophysiology of brain trauma
and concluding that shaking trauma can disrupt respiratory centers in the brain stem and
cause hypoxic injury to babies which is precisely the cause of death described by the
prosecution experts here. See Geddes et al., supra note 226; Geddes et al., supra note 315;
Rorke-Adams, supra note 315.
336 See supra notes 245-251, 259, 270-272 and accompanying text.
337 Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Cavazos v.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011). See also supra notes 227-228, 247-248, 258-260 and
accompanyng text.
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, supra note 142, at 1480 (testimony of Dr.
Chadwick).
339 Id. In other circumstances, however, death might occur hours or days later as a
result of brain swelling. Id. at 1477.
340 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
341 See id.
342 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
343 Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 at 5.
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(d) "[A]bsent Were Any Fractures, Sprains, Bleeding in the Joints, or
Displacement of the Joints "344
This statement cannot undermine the validity of any AHT/SBS diagnosis.
None of these different types of injuries are diagnostic criteria for AHT/SBS. The
medical evidence further reveals that it is not uncommon for infants suffering from
AHT/SBS to present without other musculoskeletal injuries.345
(e) "A 'Tiny'Abrasion on the Skin and a Corresponding Bruise Under the
Scalp Did Not Produce Brain Trauma" 
3 46
This concern is likely derived from Ninth Circuit dicta opining that Etzel's
"scalp abrasion was minimal and was not even discovered until well into the
autopsy" 347 and, in their view, insufficient to have caused his death. This comment
inaccurately understates the diagnostic importance of Etzel's scalp abrasion and
underlying bruise. A child of Etzel's age should not have any scalp injuries. Any
abrasions or contusions (both were present here) are significant findings because
they provide evidence indicating that the child was not merely shaken but also
impacted.348 Any evidence of impact injuries is especially important in AHT/SBS
cases because medical research shows that impact magnifies the forces to the
infant brain anywhere from ten to fifty fold, making the injury that much greater. 349
The medical evidence contradicts the Smith dissenters' suggestion that small
abrasions and contusions cannot contribute to brain trauma. In this case, Dr.
Carpenter specifically ruled out the possibility that a fall from the sofa could
account for the traumatic injuries to Etzel's head.3 50 He also testified that Etzel's
injuries could not have been caused by the administration of CPR.35 1 On this point,
34 See id. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
345 See Boos, supra note 62, at 49-74 (noting the large percentage of cases without
evidence of skeletal damage); see also infra notes 386-388 and accompanying text.
346 See Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
347 Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Smith, 132
S. Ct. at 2; Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick
v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
348 See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text (discussing the diagnostic
significance of Etzel's scalp abrasion).
349 See Duhaime et al., supra note 262, at 1822.
350 People v. Smith, No. B 18869, slip op. at 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000). On
cross-examination Dr. Carpenter acknowledged that one of Etzel's injuries, subdural
hemorrhages, could occur from a fall. Id. at 8. But the medical literature indicates that such
findings are exceedingly rare and are typically focal in nature, confined to the location of
the impact. See Case, Head Injury in Child Abuse, supra note 274, at 93, 99; Case, Inflicted
Traumatic Brain Injury, supra note 221 at 572-73. Etzel's subdural hemhorrage and
subarachnoid hemhorrage injuries are diffuse and indicative of a more global injury to the
brain produced from rotational trauma seen with shaken baby/shaken impact syndrome.
5 People v. Smith, No. BI 18869, slip op. at 7.
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the Ninth Circuit's concern that these findings were "discovered well into the
autopsy" is equally unpersuasive. Impact trauma to the head is frequently difficult
to detect on external visual inspection. In fact, this evidence can be easily missed
in children who do not die, because these lesions are best visualized during autopsy
because the scalp is revealed.35 2
Thus, there is no evidence-based reason for the Smith dissenters to have
concluded that all or any of these five medical questions cast doubt on the accuracy
of the jury verdict.
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW THE "TAIL WAGS THE DOG" ON POST-CONVICTION
REVIEW
A. The Legal Standard
1. The Smith Per Curiam Opinion and the Legal Standard
The legal standard for appellate review of state court convictions is
abundantly clear. It is, of course, the responsibility of the jury and not the appellate
court to draw conclusions based on the evidence presented at trial.353 A reviewing
court "may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only
if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." 354 Moreover, when
reviewing a decision from a state court rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge, the federal court may only overturn if the state court decision was
"objectively unreasonable."355 Under the review standard from the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.356
The Ninth Circuit had no power to afford habeas relief unless Smith could
demonstrate that the California Court of Appeals decision affirming her conviction
352 See, e.g., Duhaime et al., supra note 91, at 411; Gill et al., supra note 235, at 621.
3 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 3-4 (2011) (per curiam) ("The opinion of the
Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), makes clear that it is the responsibility
of the jury-not the court-to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence
admitted at trial.").
354 Id. at 4.
355 Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)).
356 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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"'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' clearly established
federal law as reflected in the holdings of th[e] [Supreme] Court's cases."357
The six justices who joined the Smith per curiam decision correctly held that
in granting habeas relief, the Ninth Circuit improperly ignored "the plentitude of
expert testimony in the trial record concluding that sudden shearing or tearing of
the brainstem was the cause of Etzel's death." 35 8
The Ninth Circuit's assertion that these [prosecution] experts
"reached [their] conclusion because there is no evidence in the brain
itself of the cause of death" is simply false. There was "evidence in the
brain itself." The autopsy revealed indications of recent trauma to Etzel's
brain, such as subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging, hemorrhaging
around the optic nerves, and the presence of a blood clot between the
brain hemispheres. The autopsy also revealed a bruise and abrasion on
the lower back of Etzel's head. These affirmative indications of trauma
formed the basis of the experts' opinion that Etzel died from shaking so
severe that his brainstem tore.3 59
Thus, Smith's conviction was not objectively unreasonable.3 60
2. The Smith Dissent and the Legal Standard
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the three dissenters, did not focus on the
governing legal standard when she opined that the Supreme Court erroneously
granted California's petition for review. As shown above, she also did not focus on
the extensive medical and nonmedical evidence presented at trial.36 1
. Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
358 Id. at 5-6.
35 Id. at 7.
360 See id.
361 Id. at 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Mitchell, No. CV 01-4484-
ABC, slip op. at 10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2004) (report and recommendation)). The Ninth
Circuit opinion not only echoed these comments, but took them a step further stating,
Nothing significant in the background suggests guilt, therefore, and many
factors suggest innocence. Indeed, not only was there no evidence of any
'precipitating event that might have caused [Smith] to snap,' but it is extremely
unlikely that even a very troublesome act by seven-week-old Etzel would cause
Smith to shake Etzel to death when his mother lay but a few feet away and
easily available. A constitutionally permissible finding of guilt in this case
therefore depends on the expert evidence of the cause of death.
Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Patrick v. Smith,
550 U.S. 915 (2007). This inappropriate and speculative commentary from the appellate
court does not reflect the proper postconviction review standard, which requires that the
evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to supporting the conviction.
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The dissenters apparently based their decision, at least in part, on a series of
assumptions excerpted from the 2004 opinion of the Federal Magistrate Judge who
had originally denied Smith's habeas corpus petition. These included the
following: (1) "Grandmothers, especially those not serving as the primary
caretakers, are not the typical perpetrators [in shaken baby cases];"3 62 (2) Smith
"was helping her daughter raise her other children;" 363 (3) there was "no hint of
[Smith] abusing or neglecting these other children;" 364 (4) there was "no evidence
of any precipitating event that might have caused [Smith] to snap and assault her
grandson;" 365 (5) Smith "was not trapped in a hopeless situation with a child she
did not want or love[;] [n]or was she forced to single-handedly care for a baby that
had been crying all day and all night;" 366 (6) there was "no evidence that Etzel was
doing anything other than sleeping the night he died;" 367 (7) "Etzel's mother[] was
in the room next door when Etzel died;" 368 (8) "[T]he medical evidence was not
typical ......369 These emotionally appealing, but speculative and even irrelevant,
assumptions provide significant insight into the dissenters' skewed jurisprudential
approach. There are lingering questions after any case is decided. However, the
federal magistrate who created this list, the Ninth Circuit that parroted it, and the
three Supreme Court Justices who featured it in their decision, cannot plausibly
argue that any or all of these assumptions demonstrate that Smith's conviction was
objectively unreasonable.
However, Justice Ginsburg relies on these assumptions to make a strange and
very different argument. In the dissenters' view, Smith is a "tragic" case. 370 The
death of a seven week-old child is always tragic. But Etzel's death does not appear
to be the focus of the Justices' concern. In the next sentence, they reveal their
belief that the only thing the Court has achieved by reviewing this decision from
the Ninth Circuit is "to prolong Smith's suffering and her separation from her
family."3 7 1 According to Justice Ginsburg, not only has Smith suffered enough, but
she is a loving grandmother who "poses no danger whatever to her family or
anyone else in society." 372 Returning Smith, who "the evidence indicate[s] . . . [is]
warm hearted, sensitive, and gentle," to prison will be "depriving Smith of the
liberty she currently enjoys, and her family of her care." 373 Given the extensive
inculpatory medical and nonmedical evidence presented at trial, the dissenters'







370 Id. at 9.
37' Id.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 11-12.
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unusual, extensive, and unsupported commentary regarding Smith's good character
during postconviction review merits careful consideration.
(a) Postconviction Distortion of the Medical and Nonmedical Evidence
An unfortunate reality of the postconviction review process is that pertinent
facts from the trial record are often lost, ignored, distorted, taken out of context, or
omitted as the case is presented in later hearings. In some cases, decreased judicial
reliance on the facts may be appropriate, especially where the facts have little
bearing on the legal analysis. However, in child abuse and child homicide cases,
like Smith, problems arise as multiple layers of appeals move the courts further
from the relevant facts.
At every level of appeal, the critical issue in Smith was the defendant's claim
that there was insufficient evidence of her guilt.3 74 This claim pertains to both the
sufficiency of the medical evidence regarding the victim's cause of death and the
nonmedical evidence implicating the defendant's acts as the cause of the victim's
fatal injuries.37' Because child abuse and child homicide cases invariably require
judges and juries to examine these different types of evidence, we offer four
corrections to the approach adopted in this case. These corrections elucidate how
the dissenters' distorted review of the record resulted in their legally and factually
inaccurate conclusions. They also anticipate and may help prevent similar
inaccurate evidentiary evaluations in future AHT/SBS cases.
(i) Empathy .
Empathy for the defendant based on a reviewing court's selective reading of
the evidence is improper and antithetical to the deference owed the trial jury. The
Smith dissenters' speculations about the defendant (e.g., that she was generously
helping to raise Etzel) or about grandmothers in general simply have no bearing on
the only relevant legal question-whether it was unreasonable for the jury to have
concluded (based on the medical and nonmedical evidence) that Smith had
assaulted Etzel "by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to
produce great bodily injury." 376
The Justices' unusual approach may help explain the omission of the bulk of
the inculpatory evidence contained in the trial record and their argument (despite
the clear habeas standard) that the Court should have simply refused to review the
374 See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (majority opinion); Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 885 (9th
Cir. 2006) (same), vacated sub nom. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
17 See Mitchell, 437 F.3d at 888-90. The California Court of Appeals has already
rejected defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during her direct appeal.
Id. at 885. In her federal habeas petition, Smith claimed that her due process rights were
violated because the evidence was "constitutionally insufficient" particularly with respect
to "one element of the crime-the cause of the child's death." Id.
376 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West 2008).
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Ninth Circuit decision.377 As the Court correctly-and presciently-recognized,
the dissenters may believe "that Smith, who already has served years in prison, has
been punished enough, and that she poses no danger to society[,] [t]hese or other
considerations perhaps would be grounds to seek clemency," but are not grounds
for overturning the jury verdict in this case.378
(ii) Preferencing the Nonmedical Evidence
As the Smith Court observed, the jury heard extensive medical evidence that
"Etzel died from shaking so severe that his brain stem tore"379 and that this must
have occurred while he was in the defendant's care. In the face of this evidence,
the dissenters concluded that Smith is a "warm-hearted," "sensitive," "gentle," and
"loving" grandmother. This suggests that the dissenters discounted the complex
medical evidence and focused instead on the simple (although far from entirely)
exculpatory nonmedical testimony from Smith's relatives and the fact that the
defendant was never previously charged with (or apparently even suspected of)
physically abusing Etzel. Not only are these assumptions contradicted by the trial
record, but it is an obvious logical fallacy to assume that a suspect was wrongfully
convicted simply because she does not represent the stereotypical "majority" of
offenders for a particular crime or because she has never been prosecuted or
suspected of this crime in the past.
Although there have been some studies of the statistical profile of AHT/SBS
offenders, 380 the data tells us nothing about whether Smith shook her grandson
hard enough on the night of November 29, 1996, to critically injure his brain.
Moreover, as the dissenting Justices must be aware, child abuse is almost
invariably committed by parents and caregivers who have displayed gentle and
3 According to Justice Ginsburg:
In sum, this is a notably fact-bound case in which the Court of Appeals
unquestionably stated the correct rule of law. It is thus "the type of case in which
we are most inclined to deny certiorari." Nevertheless, the Court is bent on
rebuking the Ninth Circuit for what it conceives to be defiance of our prior
remands. I would not ignore Smith's plight and choose her case as a fit
opportunity to teach the Ninth Circuit a lesson.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 460 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Of course, the Smith majority
concluded that the Ninth Circuit had erroneously overturned Smith's conviction, which
means that any "liberty" Smith enjoyed was erroneously granted in the first place.
378 Id. at 7 (majority opinion).
379 Id.
380 See, e.g., Lazoritz et al., supra note 15, at 1011 tbl.1; Suzanne Starling et al.,
Abusive Head Trauma, supra note 49, at 260-61.
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loving behavior towards the same children at other times.38 1 The assumption that a
grandmother could not harm a child simply because she is a grandmother or
because she has previously behaved gently is unsupportable. 382 Finally, Smith's
clean record also tells us nothing about her culpability. Child abuse is a crime
frequently committed by caretakers who lack any prior criminal history, but who
lose control during single or isolated episodes of violent conduct. 3 83 As all of the
judges who have reviewed this case on appeal were well aware, evidence of
Smith's violent temperament or prior bad conduct, if such evidence existed, would
have been excluded from trial under the state rules barring propensity evidence. 384
(iii) Ignoring the Obvious and Relying on the Straw Man Argument
During their review of the medical and nonmedical evidence, the dissenters
ignored the fact that Etzel was only seven weeks old and spent his brief life in a
home surrounded by other relatives. The close proximity of other relatives may
have insulated Etzel from other abusive acts because child abuse typically occurs
381 See FRASIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 406 (noting that those who abuse children,
"[w]ith rare exceptions . . . do so in private . . . and maintain a completely normal
appearance in every other way").
382 In child abuse cases,
[j]urors and judges frequently have a difficult time conceptualizing parents
as abusers of their children. They are reluctant to believe that an apparently
loving caretaker would purposely injure their child. Many SBS cases do not
involve caretakers who deliberately set out to kill or injure the child by violently
shaking them. Rather these consequences often result from the caretaker's loss
of control and momentary violent behavior directed toward the child. This
explanation does not mean that SBS cases are "unintentional" crimes within the
legal definition of "intent," or that the offender is less culpable because they did
not specifically set out to kill or maim the baby. Shaking a vulnerable infant is
still a deliberate act of extreme violence which justifies holding the caretaker
accountable for the dire consequences which ensue.
Holmgren, supra note 168, at 289; see also FRASIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 399, 408
(noting "[tihere is no 'profile' of typical child abusers," and "people who cause serious
head injuries to children may have never harmed anyone prior to that," but still merit
"prosecution and punishment" notwithstanding claims by character witnesses suggesting
the caretakers are loving and are not the type of people who could ever harm a child).
383 See W. Hobart Davies & Molly Murphy Garwood, Who Are the Perpetrators and
Why Do They Do It?, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH,
supra note 9, at 41, 49.
384 The then applicable rule of evidence barred admission of bad character or prior
conduct evidence for propensity purposes, but allowed it to show motive, intent,
knowledge, or the absence of mistake or accident. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West
2009). The current California evidentiary rule permits the evidence for propensity
purposes.
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when a caregiver is left alone with a child."' While the dissenters use the fact that
Etzel did not have any fractures or sprains as a straw man to suggest that Smith
could not have shaken Etzel because she did not inflict other types of injuries, this
argument cannot be sustained.3 86
The lack of physical evidence of different types of abusive injuries is both
unsurprising, in this case, and well documented in the child abuse literature.387 The
dissenters' concern about the lack of other types of abusive injuries also ignores
the fact that the medical evidence did show that Etzel had suffered similar injuries
in the past. Etzel's autopsy revealed an earlier brain injury and older optic nerve
bleeding, which clearly indicated prior head trauma. These findings were not
disputed by the defendant's experts. 388 No evidence was presented at trial to
establish that Smith was not in a position to have caused this prior trauma.
(iv) Discounting the Inculpatroy Nonmedical Evidence
According to Justice Ginsburg, the nonmedical evidence offered by the
prosecution was "meager" because (1) "[t]here was no evidence whatever that
Smith abused her grandchildren in the past or acted with any malicious intent on
the night in question"; 389 (2) there was no "motive or precipitating event that might
have led Smith to shake Etzel violently"; 390 (3) there was no "evidence [that]
showed that Etzel was crying in the hours before he died";391 and (4) "[a]ny loud
crying likely would have woken Etzel's siblings, Yondale, age 14 months, and
Yolanda, age 4, asleep only feet away, even Etzel's mother, Tomeka, asleep in the
neighboring room." 392 As shown above, these speculations are not just a distortion
of the record, they are legally irrelevant because the defendant was convicted
385 See ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND
FORENSIC REFERENCE, supra, note 9 at 358; THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 9, at 238, 284.
386 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
387 See Goldberg, supra note 100 (quoting Allison Scobie-Carroll, Program Director,
Child Protection Program, Children's Hospital Boston, who has also commented that
"[e]ach year our team consults on approximately 1800 cases of child maltreatment. And
each year we are directly involved in the care of dozens of cases of abusive head trauma. It
has been my experience that despite our wishes to the contrary, some caregivers (even
those with no known documented history of violence toward others, and even those who
closely resemble the very lawyers and physicians enlisted to defend them) do, in fact,
inflict devastating and irrevocable harm on children"); see also Boos, supra note 62, at 51
(noting that between 38-65% of cases lack skeletal findings such as rib or metaphyseal
fractures); Lazoritz et al., supra note 15 (noting skull fractures found in 13 of 71 (18.3%)
AHT patients, and 23 (32.4%) having rib or long bone fractures); Duhaime, supra note 91,
at 410 (noting extracranial trauma in only 37% of the cases and old trauma in only 6%).
388 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 5 (2011) (per curiam).





under a California child abuse statute that specifically does not require proof of
motive or malicious intent.393
The dissenters' skewed jurisprudential approach to the nonmedical evidence
is best illustrated by their treatment of the defendant's multiple admissions that she
shook or "jostled" Etzel immediately before he died. According to Justice
Ginsburg, Smith's admission that she had given Etzel "a little shake, a jostle to
awaken him" and then asked, "'Oh, my God. Did I do it? Did I do it? Oh, my
God,"' "cannot be equated to a confession of guilt." While Smith's admission is
strongly suggestive of her guilt, and likely was understood as inculpatory by the
jury, Justice Ginsburg opines that "[g]iving a baby 'a little shake, a jostle to wake
him"' cannot be "an admission to shaking a child violently, causing his brainstem
to tear."394
This conclusion is remarkable for several reasons. First, the dissenters claim
the almost supernatural ability to determine (without citation to a single source)
that what the perpetrator has described as "a little shake"' cannot possibly result in
traumatic head injury. Second, the dissenters ignore the legal standard, which
requires that they take the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the
jury's conviction, that is, that the jurors could have found that the defendant had
admitted the specific mechanism of traumatic injury while simultaneously
attempting to minimize the severity of her actions. Third, the dissenters ignore
readily available medical research establishing that perpetrators often initially
provide false information regarding how abusive injuries occurred.395 As the three
dissenting Justices must know, perpetrators who make admissions frequently
minimize the force or violence associated with their conduct.
The dissenters take a similarly dismissive approach, or simply ignore, the
following additional inculpatory nonmedical evidence: (1) the undisputed fact that
the defendant was the only adult in the living room with Etzel from midnight until
he stopped breathing; (2) the evidence that Etzel was asymptomatic prior to the
time the defendant was left alone with him; (3) the defendant's statement that Etzel
fell off the couch, a claim that is developmentally unlikely for a seven-week-old
infant; (4) the defendant's conflicting statements to the social worker and to the
police; (5) testimony from the social worker that the defendant demonstrated
shaking Etzel; and (6) evidence that Tomeka, Etzel's mother, accused the
defendant of causing Etzel's death during the interview with the social worker.3 96
393 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273ab (West 2008) ("Any person who, having the care or
custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that
to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the
child's death, shall be punished by imprisonment. . . .").
394 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Duhaime, supra note 91, at 410 tbl.2; Carole Jenny et al., Analysis of
Missed Cases of Abusive Head Trauma, 282 JAMA 621, 622 (1999); James A. O'Neill et
al., Patterns of Injury in the Battered Child Syndrome, 13 J. TRAUMA 332, 332 (1973). See
also sU ra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
39 Smith, 132 S. Ct. at II (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to the dissenters,
"[t]he social worker also testified that Etzel's mother, Tomeka, told Smith: 'If it wasn't for
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(b)' Preventing Future Courts from Making Similar Mistakes
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor are apparently convinced that
"[w]hat is now known about SBS casts grave doubt on the charge leveled against
Smith"3 97 in this case and more generally that "[d]oubt has increased in the medical
community 'over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone."' 398
As the foregoing review of the medical and nonmedical evidence demonstrates,
appellate court conclusions in child abuse and child homicide cases may be based
on a distorted analysis of the record and, as we discuss in a companion article, 399
an equally skewed and inaccurate review of the medical literature.
The Smith dissenters' myopic view of the evidence muddies their analysis of
the legal and scientific questions and raises real concerns about the message sent to
future courts, the media, and the public. Viewed most charitably, the opinion may
reflect an empathetic rejection of the horrifying notion that anyone capable of
being a loving grandmother could lose control once and shake her infant grandson
hard enough to cause his death. However, the Smith dissent is dangerous because it
appears to add legitimacy to the false AHT/SBS controversy, which continues to
gain traction despite its lack of empirical or clinical support.400 Left uncorrected
and misunderstood, these problems will make it harder for judges and juries to
focus on the medical evidence and reach accurate verdicts. Outside the courthouse,
we hope to prevent these decisions from promulgating misinformation about how
infants can be injured or killed by shaking that directly threatens vital public health
and child abuse prevention, investigation, and prosecution efforts.401
you this wouldn't have happened."' Id. at n.3. On this point, Justice Ginsburg simply
ignored the requirement that the reviewing court take this evidence as true adding only that
"Tomeka denied making any statement to that effect." Id.
397 Id. at 10.
398 Id.
399 Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 17.
400 See sources cited supra notes 8-9.
401 See Christian & Block, supra note 15, at 1409-11 (setting forth the American
Academy of Pediatrics position paper on AHT and discussing the public health and
prevention efforts encouraged by the Academy to educate parents about the dangers of
shaking).

